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Across the United States, mass murder events have been on the rise for nearly a decade. 
This thesis found that persons with serious mental illness perpetrated a statistically 
significant number of these events. Currently, law enforcement agencies are often the 
first—and in many communities the only resource—available to assist and assess 
mentally ill persons in crisis. This thesis investigated the current state of law enforcement 
training as it relates to assessing dangerousness and the risk for violence among persons 
with serious mental illness. It found that there is very little training and no risk 
assessment tool or guide currently available to assist law enforcement officers tasked 
with assessing mentally ill persons for dangerousness. Subsequently, this thesis examined 
alternative methods and models for assessing risk, including clinical violence risk 
assessments, and it conducted summary case studies. These included cases in which 
mentally ill persons committed acts of mass murder and cases where law enforcement 
successfully intervened and prevented mentally ill persons from carrying out planned 
violence. As a result of this research and analysis, a field risk assessment guide has been 
developed and recommended for adoption to aid law enforcement officers in assessing 
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Law enforcement officers are regularly called upon to respond to assist mentally ill 
persons in crisis; some experts estimate that as many as 20 percent of all law enforcement 
calls for service involve persons with a mental illness.1 In the majority of communities 
across the country, law enforcement is the first and often the sole community resource 
that can be called upon to respond and address mentally ill persons in various stages of 
crisis.2 A growing body of evidence now suggests that a subgroup of persons with serious 
mental illness—those who are psychotic, not taking their medications, or are self-
medicating through substance abuse—are significantly more dangerous than a person in 
the general population.3 This places a significant public safety obligation upon law 
enforcement officers, as well as the duty to ensure that the mentally ill persons receive 
proper care and treatment for their condition. 
Historically, the rationale for law enforcement intervention in non-criminal 
situations involving mentally ill persons is derived from two common-law principles: 1) 
the power and authority of police to protect the safety and welfare of the community, and 
2) the state’s parens patriae duty to act on the behalf of citizens who are temporarily or 
permanently incapable of caring for themselves.4 
Recently, mass murders perpetrated by persons suffering from serious mental 
illness (SMI), including the Washington Navy Yard shooting and the Isla Vista, 
California shooting, have resulted in increased scrutiny of law enforcement’s role in 
managing mentally ill persons and also sparked a national dialogue about what can be 
done to prevent future incidence of violence by persons with a SMI. While mental 
disorders are generally widespread, with nearly one in four Americans affected, about six 
1 Kevin Johnson, “Mental Illness Cases Swamp Criminal Justice System,” USA Today, July 21, 2014, 
accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/longform/news/nation/2014/07/21/mental-illness-
law-enforcement-cost-of-not-caring/9951239/  
2 Richard Lamb, Linda E. Weinberger, and Walter J. DeCuir, Jr., “The Police and Mental Health,” 





                                                 
percent of the population (or approximately 19 million people in the United States)5 are 
believed to suffer from a serious mental illness.6 Closer analysis of the mass murders 
committed from January 2013 through December 2013 reveals that while are a variety of 
motives for mass murder, at least half of all identified perpetrators of mass murder 
studied in this thesis suffered from serious mental illness or were suspected by those 
closest to them of having serious mental disorder. 
 
Figure 1. Prevalence of Mental Illness among Mass Murderers, 2013 
 
According to the FBI, the incidence mass shootings and mass murder are on the 
rise nationally, now averaging roughly 16 a year, up from an average of six per year only 
a decade ago.7 This places a significant responsibility upon law enforcement officers 
5 Serious mental illness (SMI) is defined as (1) all cases of schizophrenia; (2) severe cases of major 
depression and bipolar disorder; (3) severe cases of panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder; (4) severe cases of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder; and (5) severe 
cases of anorexia nervosa. Timothy A. Kelly, “A Policymaker’s Guide to Mental Illness,” The Heritage 
Foundation, March 7, 2002, accessed March 13, 2013, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2002/03/bg1522es-a-policymakers-guide-to-mental-illness  
6 Ronald Kessler, Wai Tat Chiu, Olga Demler, and Ellen E. Walters, “Prevalence, Severity, and 
Comorbidity of Twelve-month DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication,” 
Archives of General Psychiatry 62, no. 6 (2005): 617–627. 
7 Delvin Barrett, “Mass Shootings on the Rise, FBI Says,” The Wall Street Journal, September 24, 





28 Mass Murders in the United States 
January - December 2013 
Mental Illness Diagnosed, or
Suspected in 14 Cases
Perpetrator or Condition
Unknown in 9 Cases
No Mental Illness Diagnosed, or
Suspected in 5 Cases
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who, due to their frequent interaction with mentally ill persons, must be adequately 
trained and equipped to assess the potential dangerousness of this growing population. 
Currently, law enforcement training regarding managing mentally ill persons is 
limited. According to a study of 70 participating law enforcement agencies conducted in 
2003, the median number of training hours for new recruits was 6.5, while the median for 
in-service training was a paltry one-hour of training.8 Worse, there is no law enforcement 
training specific to conducting risk assessments of mentally ill persons for dangerousness, 
in spite of this being a routine function of law enforcement when called to assist a 
mentally ill person in crisis. As a result, most law enforcement assessments for 
dangerousness are conducted in a parochial, dichotomous manner—either there is a risk, 
or there is not.  
Where law enforcement has made progress is in the realm of behavioral threat 
assessments (BTAs). This is based on the work of Robert A. Fein, a clinical psychologist 
with the U.S. Secret Service, and Bryan Vossekuil, a special agent with the Secret 
Service, who conducted the Exceptional Case Study Project in the 1990s.9 This research 
employed an incident focused, behavior-based approach to analyzing 83 persons known 
to have engaged in 73 incidents of assassination, near assassination, or attack on public 
officials from 1949 to 1995.10 This research has since been applied to the problem of 
identifying potential school shooters with some success, and it is informative in 
approaching the issue of violence among the mentally ill. But BTAs differ from the 
violence risk assessment law enforcement is expected to conduct when dealing with a 
mentally ill person in crisis in regards to the goals, context, process, structure, and, most 
importantly, time line.11  
8 Judy Hails, and Randy Borum, “Police Training and Specialized Approaches to Respond to People 
with Mental Illnesses,” Crime and Delinquency 49, no. 1 (January 2003): 52–61.  
9 Robert A. Fein, and Bryan Vossekuil, “Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: 
A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials,” U.S. Department of Justice, 1998, accessed June 
23, 2013, http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/PI_Guide.pdf  
10 “National Threat Assessment Center,” U.S. Secret Service, accessed October 2, 2014, 
http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.shtml  
11 Ibid., 13. 
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While law enforcement is deficient in tools and training for assessing the 
dangerousness or risk for violence among mentally ill persons, researchers, clinicians, 
and experts in the field of mental illness are not. Researchers and clinicians have 
established rich theoretical frameworks and benefit from decades of significant research 
and experience in violence risk assessments of mentally ill persons. Subsequently, 
clinicians have developed several validated tools for assessing the risk for violence 
among the mentally ill, including Hare’s psychopathy checklist, the historical, clinical 
risk management-20 (HCR-20), the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), and the 
vaunted McArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study (VRAS). Most importantly, as a result 
of this research and experience, clinicians abandoned the dichotomous “yes/no” approach 
to dangerousness, and instead view dangerousness as existing on a continuum. 
Furthermore, though clinical violence risk assessment is still an evolving field of 
study, what has been conclusively established is that: 1) violence does occur with some 
degree of frequency among persons with mental illness; 2) that persons with certain 
mental disorders and symptom clusters are more likely to engage in violent behavior than 
persons without such; and 3) mental health professionals have some success in assessing 
the risk for violence among persons with mental disorder.12 
Given this growing public safety problem, this research explores the current state 
of law enforcement training regarding the assessment of persons with mental illness, and 
asks whether law enforcement could adapt and apply proven clinical methods for gauging 
the risk for violence. This research also applied Professor Erik J. Dahl’s Theory of 
Preventive Action, which postulates that there are two key factors necessary to prevent an 
attack. First, there must be precise warning with a near tactical level of specificity, and, 
second, there must be a high degree of receptivity with regard to the warning signs by 
those in a position to act.13 Furthermore, Dahl suggests that the best way to analyze 
failures to stop attacks is to compare them to successfully preempted attacks.14  
12 Randy Otto, “Assessing and Managing Violence Risk in Outpatient Settings,” Journal of Clinical 
Psychology 56, no. 10 (2000): 1239–1262. 
13 Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 2–4. 
14 Ibid., 15. 
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Subsequently, four sample cases were examined; two cases where attacks by 
mentally ill perpetrators were completed, and two where they were thwarted by law 
enforcement. These cases were selected because in each instance, the perpetrator had 
contact with law enforcement prior to violence. The purpose of considering these cases is 
to examine what indications of dangerousness were available at the time law enforcement 
officers contacted the subject and to determine if these indicators correspond with 
violence risk factors established by clinicians. 
What this research found was that in some cases, there are sufficient risk factors 
and warning signs of potential violence, corresponding to clinical risk factors, that law 
enforcement can identify and act upon in order to pre-empt violence. This research also 
found that in the cases of completed attacks by mentally ill perpetrators where there were 
sufficient risk factors present, law enforcement officers were either unaware of the risk 
factors or demonstrated a low level of receptivity to those factors. Conversely, in cases of 
thwarted attacks, law enforcement officers demonstrated a high level of receptivity to the 
warning signs and risk factors presented, prompting further investigation and 
intervention. 
Finally, this research explored cases where mentally ill persons perpetrated or 
planned violence, confirmed that there were sufficient warning signs that correspond to 
clinical risk factors for violence, and integrates these risk factors into a new law 
enforcement risk assessment instrument. This field risk assessment guide is not intended 
to limit officer discretion or dictate what action officers take. Instead, by synthesizing 
proven risk factors from clinical and BTA models, it provides a framework for 
conducting comprehensive, uniform risk assessments with the hope of preventing 
violence. This new instrument should serve as the template for law enforcement agencies 
nationally in moving towards the goal of preventing acts of violence by persons with 
mental illness.  
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Tuesday, September 6, 2011, was an archetypal late-summer morning in the 
capital city of Nevada. The sun had risen into a cloudless sky and the cool morning 
temperature, so typical of life at altitude in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, was quickly 
yielding to a comfortably warm day.  
At 9 a.m., life tragically changed for many in the city. Eduard Sencion, a 33-year-
old man who had been previously diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, walked into 
the International House of Pancakes (IHOP) on South Carson Street with an AK-47 rifle 
and opened fire. After shooting randomly around the restaurant, Sencion locked in on a 
table of Nevada Army National Guardsmen and women eating breakfast in the far corner. 
In a matter of seconds, Sencion had shot all five, instantly killing one, and mortally 
wounding two others. Sencion then exited the restaurant, shooting a woman in the head 
as she tried to flee. When he was finished, Sencion had shot 10 people, four of whom 
died at the scene. Sencion then took his own life in the parking lot—a single gunshot to 
the head—before police arrived on scene.  
In the weeks and months following the shooting, those closest to the case 
struggled to make sense of what had happened and of what they had seen. There is 
dissonance in seeing the dead and dying lined up on the ground in front of a 
neighborhood eatery. Investigators were never able to adequately explain why Sencion 
had “snapped” or why he had chosen the IHOP. The investigation did reveal that Sencion 
had long struggled with schizophrenia and often experienced command voices telling him 
to “do bad things” to people. Debate raged among the investigators as to whether an 
event of this type could be prevented; the consensus was that it could not. But there was 
one dissenting vote.  
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It is clear that severely mentally ill individuals are responsible, by 
conservative estimates, for at least 5 percent of all homicides in the United 
States and for up to half of all “rampage” murders. Must we wait until 
such violence increases before we act?1 
 
A. DISCUSSION 
Throughout the United States today, police regularly encounter persons with 
serious mental illnesses in a range of circumstances and settings—in a dangerous health 
crisis, an incidence of domestic violence, a narcotics related arrest, the scene of some 
public disturbance or a serious violent crime, in a homeless encampment, or in a hospital 
emergency room.2 
Recently, several widely publicized mass murders3 involving mentally ill 
perpetrators have shocked the nation, raising public awareness and concern regarding 
violence perpetrated by persons with mental illness. From Newtown, Connecticut, to 
Aurora, Colorado, to Tucson, Arizona, communities large and small struggle to make 
sense of the senseless. Though statistically rare, it is this very senselessness and apparent 
randomness that makes such attacks all the more horrific. In the wake of the devastation 
wrought by a handful of mass murderers, politicians, peace officers, policy makers, and 
mental health experts struggle to explain why these events occurred, and what, if 
anything, can be done to prevent the next one. 
In truth, the chance of being killed by a mentally ill mass murderer is, much like 
dying as the result of terrorism, statistically quite rare, but national media coverage and 
the horrific nature of these events has led to a heightened sense of crisis and increased 
1 E. Fuller Torrey, The Insanity Offense: How America’s Failure to Treat the Seriously Mentally Ill 
Endangers Its Citizens (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 2008), 166. 
2 Jennifer Wood et al., Police Interventions with Persons Affected by Mental Illness (Piscataway, NJ: 
Rutgers Center for Behavioral Health Services & Criminal Justice Research, 2011), 2. 
3 The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines mass murder as a number of murders, typically four or 
more, occurring during the same incident, with no distinctive time period between the murders. Robert J. 
Morton, ed., “Serial Murder: Multi-disciplinary Perspectives for Investigators,” FBI Behavioral Analysis 
Unit 2, 2005, accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/serial-murder 
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calls for government officials to act.4 As with terrorism, mass-mediated acts of domestic 
mass murder have resulted in calls for bold restrictions on civil liberties in the form of 
gun control, first and foremost.5 
Nationwide, law enforcement agencies are experiencing an increase in encounters 
involving mentally ill persons. Some estimate that as many as 20 percent of all police 
calls for service involve a mentally ill person.6 This trend is largely attributable to three 
factors: 1) the de-institutionalization of the mentally ill that began roughly five decades 
ago; 2) more recent cuts to programs designed to treat the mentally ill;7 and 3) an influx 
of war veterans returning home with post-traumatic stress disorder and other 
psychological problems.8 In spite of this increased interaction between law enforcement 
and the mentally ill, a recent study of 174 police departments serving cities of 100,000 
residents or more found that more than half of these departments had no specialized 
response for dealing with mentally ill persons9 and very little training.  
While law enforcement agencies have responded to hundreds of active shooter 
events over the last several decades, the police remain largely reactive, responding to 
these events only after they have unfolded. Following significant criticism regarding 
police tactics in the wake of the 1999 Columbine High School massacre that left 15 dead 
and 21 injured; law enforcement agencies (LEAs) across the country began adapting their 
response protocols to active shooter events. Now, rather than employ the traditional tactic 
4 Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, and Philip G. Zimbardo, 
eds. Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 117. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Kevin Johnson, “Mental Illness Cases Swamp Criminal Justice System,” USA Today, July 21, 2014, 
accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/longform/news/nation/2014/07/21/mental-illness-
law-enforcement-cost-of-not-caring/9951239/  
7 According to the USA Today, states cut $5 billion and 10 percent of psychiatric beds from 2009 to 
2012. Liz Szabo, “Psychiatric Bed Disappear Despite Growing Demand,” USA Today, May 12, 2014, 
accessed June 17, 2014. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/12/disappearing-hospital-
beds/9003677/  
8 Cynthia Hubert, “Police Say Violent Encounters with Mentally Ill People on the Rise,” Sacramento 
Bee, August 25, 2014, accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.sacbee.com/2014/08/25/6651255/police-
say-violent-encounters.html  
9 Martha Williams Dean et al., “Emerging Partnerships between Mental Health and Law 
Enforcement,” Psychiatric Services 50, no. 1 (January 1999): 99–101, accessed September 1, 2014, 
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/mental_illness/PDFs/Deane_etal_1999.pdf  
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of surrounding the scene and waiting for specialized units to arrive, officers have been 
instructed to respond rapidly, make entry without delay, and quickly locate and engage 
the assailant.10 Much has been done to improve law enforcement’s response to active 
shooter events in the 15 years following Columbine, but the fact remains that many of 
these events are over before the first officers arrive on scene, and the damage done in the 
few minutes before law enforcement officers (LEOs) have arrived is often catastrophic.11 
In light of the ineffectiveness of focusing solely on the response to such crimes, more 
must be done to prevent them from occurring in the first place.  
This thesis does not seek to explain why some mentally ill subjects commit acts of 
mass murder; rather, this research will explore the current law enforcement approach to 
assessing the risk for violence among the mentally ill, determine if it is effective, and 
what, if anything, can be done to improve it. Responding to mentally ill persons in crisis, 
who may not have committed a crime, is a relatively new role for law enforcement. 
Traditionally tasked with responding to crimes after they have occurred, now more and 
more law enforcement officers are being called upon to assist with mentally ill persons in 
crisis, a core component of which involves assessing dangerousness and the risk for 
violence.12  
As they did in the days leading up to the Washington Navy Yard (WNY) 
shooting, when two different LEAs contacted a distraught and paranoid Aaron Alexis, the 
eventual WNY shooter, police officers regularly come in contact with mentally ill 
subjects in various stages of crisis, and serve as the nation’s front line responders in 
mental health emergencies.13 This reliance on law enforcement has been made more 
acute by the widespread deinstitutionalization of persons suffering from serious mental 




12 Randy Borum, Robert Fien, Bryan Vossekuil, and John Berglund, “Threat Assessment: Defining an 
Approach for Evaluating Risk of Targeted Violence,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 17, no. 3 (1999): 
323–337.  
13 Henry J. Steadman et al., “Comparing Outcomes of Major Models of Police Responses to Mental 
Health Emergencies,” Psychiatric Services 51, no. 5, (2000): 645–649.  
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illness and subsequent lack of adequate treatment facilities and inpatient bed space. 
While statistically few of these subjects will commit acts of violence, let alone mass 
murder, given the catastrophic nature of these events, law enforcement personnel must be 
better equipped to assess dangerousness and the potential risk for such extreme violence.  
Saying that we cannot know is not enough.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Many communities across the country have been rocked by horrific mass 
murders, many of which involve mentally ill assailants. Law enforcement officers are the 
first, and in many cases the only community resource available to respond to mentally ill 
persons in crisis, to provide a type of triage service to the mentally ill, and to assess their 
needs, and the risk they might pose to themselves and the community.14 Too often, this is 
assessment is done with little to no training. 
While the incidence of single death homicides have been on the decline nationally 
for several decades now, mass murders are on the rise.15 Though not simply a twenty-
first century phenomenon, mass murders, active shooter events, and the number of 
casualties from these incidents have been rising steadily over the past decade.16 
Some work has been done to prevent violence, with the Secret Service and 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) leading the way in research on behavioral threat 
analysis. This research, known as behavioral threat assessment (BTA), has focused 
primarily on assassins and school shooters. Current BTA is predicated on the notion that 
these attackers “consider, plan, and prepare,”17 resulting in detectable behavior that can 
14 Peter C. Patch, and Bruce A. Arrigo, “Police Officer Attitudes and Use of Discretion in Situations 
Involving the Mentally Ill,” International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 22, no. 1 (1999): 23–35.  
15 Dale Archer, “Mass Murders are on the Rise: Single Death Homicides are Down While Mass 
Murders Are Up. Why?” Psychology Today, July 28, 2012, accessed March 17, 2014, 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/reading-between-the-headlines/201207/mass-murders-are-the-rise  
16 J. Pete Blair, M. Hunter Martaindale, and Terry Nichols, “Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 
2012,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, January 2014, http://leb.fbi.gov/2014/january/active-shooter-events-
from-2000-to-2012  
17 Andre Simons, FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit (Quantico, VA: National Center for the Analysis of 
Violent Crime, 2012), accessed April 5, 2014, 
http://www.dbhds.virginia.gov/documents/130124Simons.pdf  
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provide opportunities for detection and disruption. But this model may not apply to 
mentally ill assailants, who often seem to attack spontaneously, without motive, rationale, 
or planning. 
Prevention efforts have also focused on hardening facilities such as school 
campuses, government offices, and the like. These efforts to harden facilities often focus 
on denying access to assailants, improving employee response to such incidents, and 
occasionally include armed or unarmed security personnel. These efforts are clearly an 
important component to violence prevention and mitigation, but they are only part of the 
equation, and ultimately these efforts are unlikely to stop determined assailants like those 
who successfully attacked the Washington Navy Yard and Fort Hood on two separate 
occasions.  
While the incidence of violence among the mentally ill, particularly those 
suffering from schizophrenia18 or mental illness with co-occurring substance abuse19 is 
statistically significant, very few persons suffering from mental illness will commit 
murder, let alone mass murder. However, in spite of the statistics, there appears to be a 
troubling trend nationally: persons suffering from mental illness perpetrating horrific acts 
of mass murder, and this happens despite contact with law enforcement, mental health 
professionals, and others who were, or should have been aware of some level of 
dangerousness and risk.  
There have been more than 200 mass murder events in the United States since 
2006, which equates to a mass murder somewhere in the United States about once every 
two weeks.20 Closer analysis of the mass murders committed from January 2013 through 
December 2013, reveals that while there exists a variety of motives for mass murder, at 
18 Patricia A. Brennan, Sarnoff A. Mednick, and Sheilagh Hodgins, “Major Mental Disorders and 
Criminal Violence in a Danish Birth Cohort,” Archives of General Psychiatry 57, no. 5 (May 2000): 494–
500. 
19 Jill RachBeisel, Jack Scott, and Lisa Dixon, “Co-Occurring Severe Mental Illness and Substance 
Use Disorders: A Review of Recent Research,” Psychiatric Services 50, no. 11 (1999), 1427–1434, 
accessed August 25, 2014, http://journals.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleid=83559#Conclusions  
20 Jodi Upton, Paul Overberg, and Meghan Hoyer, “Behind the Bloodshed: The Untold Story of 
America’s Mass Killings,” USA Today, December 4, 2013, accessed December 6, 2013, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/mass-killings/index.html#explore  
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least half of all identified perpetrators of mass murder suffered from serious mental 
illness or were suspected of having a serious mental disorder by friends and family. 
Figure 1 examines the 28 mass murder events resulting in 128 victims in 2013. Exactly 
half of the perpetrators were known to have or suspected of having a serious mental 
illness, nine are unknown, and only five were known to not suffer from any mental 
illness.  
 
Figure 1.  Prevalence of Mental Illness Among Mass Murderers, 201321 
These figures are startling and help explain the growing public concern regarding 
the apparent correlation between mental illness and violence. Subsequently, LEOs and 
other first responders who are regularly called upon to respond and assist mentally ill 
persons in crisis must be prepared to effectively assess mentally ill subjects for 
dangerousness, to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment, and take appropriate action 
to prevent violence. 
Further complicating matters is deinstitutionalization, which has resulted in a 
shortage of beds in the few remaining inpatient treatment facilities. By some estimates, 
jails and prisons now house more than 356,000 persons with mental illness, compared to 




28 Mass Murders in the United States 
January - December 2013 
Mental Illness Diagnosed, or
Suspected in 14 Cases
Perpetrator or Condition
Unknown in 9 Cases
No Mental Illness Diagnosed, or
Suspected in 5 Cases
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just 35,000 in state hospitals.22 Jails in particular have become a revolving door for 
mentally ill subjects in crisis, defacto mental institutions,23 but incarceration is a costly 
and short-term solution with all but the most violent of offenders soon released back into 
the community. This makes the management of violent people suffering from mental 
illness a topic of major concern to clinicians and criminologists alike.24  
Currently, clinicians and LEOs largely operate apart from each other, with 
clinicians bearing primary responsibility for assessing the potential future risk for 
violence, and law enforcement officers typically responding once someone is in crisis, or 
violence has occurred. As a result, clinicians have vastly improved their ability to assess 
the risk for violence in persons suffering from mental illness, while law enforcement 
officers have few tools, and little guidance regarding how to assess dangerousness, or 
when to act to prevent violence.  
While mental disorders are relatively widespread, with nearly one in four 
Americans affected, only about six percent of the population are believed to suffer from a 
serious mental illness (SMI)25 or approximately 19 million people across the United 
States.26 It is this six percent that accounts for many of the calls for law enforcement to 
assist or intervene—to quickly assess the dangerousness of an individual and make a 
reasonable decision often without complete knowledge. LEOs, used to proving things 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” must become more comfortable with making such critical 
forecasts of dangerousness realizing that, as Kenneth Arrow has stated, “most individuals 
22 Jenny Gold, “The Mentally Ill Mostly Go to Jail, Not Psych Hospitals: American Jails House 10 
Times More Mentally Ill People than State Hospitals,” Kaiser Health News, April 9, 2014, accessed April 
11, 2014, http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/the-mentally-ill-mostly-go-to-jail-not-.html  
23 Torrey, The Insanity Offense, 129.  
24 Eric Silver, “Understanding the Relationship between Mental Disorder and Violence: The Need for 
a Criminological Perspective,” Law and Human Behavior 30, no. 6 (2006): 685–706.  
25Serious mental illness (SMI) is defined as (1) all cases of schizophrenia; (2) severe cases of major 
depression and bipolar disorder; (3) severe cases of panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder; (4) severe cases of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder; and (5) severe 
cases of anorexia nervosa. Timothy A. Kelly, “A Policymaker’s Guide to Mental Illness,” The Heritage 
Foundation, March 7, 2002, accessed March 13, 2013, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2002/03/bg1522es-a-policymakers-guide-to-mental-illness 
26 Ronald Kessler, Chiu, Wai Tat, Demler, Olga, and Ellen E. Walters, “Prevalence, Severity, and 
Comorbidity of Twelve-month DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication,” 
Archives of General Psychiatry 62, no. 6 (2005): 617–627. 
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underestimate the uncertainty of the world…our knowledge of the way things work, in 
society or in nature, comes trailing clouds of vagueness.”27  
Law enforcement training on interacting with mentally ill persons has evolved 
and improved dramatically over the past several decades. Considered by many to be a 
law enforcement “best practice,” crisis intervention teams (CIT) consisting of officers 
specially trained to respond to mentally ill persons in crisis are popping up in agencies of 
all sizes across the country.28, CIT, also known as the Memphis model for the city where 
it was first developed and instituted, focuses almost exclusively on de-escalating 
situations involving mentally ill persons.29 While de-escalation is crucial, training for 
assessing dangerousness and the risk for violence posed by a mentally ill person is 
conspicuously absent from the CIT curriculum.  
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “risk” as “the possibility of loss or 
injury: peril.”30 Moreover, risk analysis involves considering the following three 
questions: 1) what can happen? 2) how likely is it that it will happen?, and 3) if it does 
happen, how bad will it be?31 A risk assessment, then, for the purposes of this research is 
defined as a prediction of risk resulting from a systematic evaluation of facts and 
circumstances obtained in the course of an investigation.32 Considering the tragic 
outcomes in many well publicized cases involving violent mentally ill persons, it is 
27 Michael Szenberg, Eminent Economists: Their Life Philosophies (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
28 Johnny K. Jines, “Crisis Intervention Teams: Responding to Mental Illness Crisis Calls,” FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin, January 2013, http://leb.fbi.gov/2013/january/crisis-intervention-teams-responding-
to-mental-illness-crisis-calls;  
Kevin Johnson, “Memphis Program Offers Example for Police and Mentally Ill,” USA Today, October 
2, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/02/police-navy-yard-mental-illness-alexis-
shooting/2910763/  
29 Randolph DuPont et al., Crisis Intervention Team Core Elements (Memphis, TN: University of 
Memphis School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy, 2007), 
http://cit.memphis.edu/information_files/CIT_Brief_Overview_Presentation_Slides.pdf  
30 Merriam-Webster, s.v., “risk,” accessed March 14, 2014, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/risk  
31 Stanley Kaplan, and B. John Garrick, “On the Quantitative Definition of Risk,” Risk Analysis 1, no. 
1 (1981): 11–27.  
32 Wayne Petherick, Applied Crime Analysis: A Social Science Approach to Understanding Crime, 
Criminals, and Victims (Waltham, MA: Anderson Publishing 2015), 173. 
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important to evaluate how well law enforcement is doing in assessing dangerousness and 
managing persons suffering from mental illness.  
A review of the literature has revealed that while there are numerous violence risk 
assessment tools available to clinicians, there is little to assist law enforcement or other 
first responders with assessing the potential risk for violence when dealing with mentally 
ill persons. This thesis seeks to examine the problem of violence, extreme violence, and 
mass murder in particular, perpetrated by persons with serious mental illness. Through 
the research, the intent is to identify strategies to better equip LEOs and other first 
responders to assess the risk for violence among the mentally ill.  
The essence of risk management lies in maximizing the areas where we 
have some control over the outcome while minimizing the areas where we 
have absolutely no control over the outcome and the linkage between 
effect and cause is hidden from us…Further, when information is 
incomplete, as it almost always is, we must apply inductive reasoning to 
assess the risk of something happening.33  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question this research seeks to address is: Can law enforcement 
preempt mass murder and other violent events perpetrated by persons with serious 
mental illness by employing clinical violence risk assessment techniques? To answer this 
question, this research will assess current law enforcement practices and both clinical risk 
assessment and behavioral threat assessment models for assessing the risk for violence. 
The research will also examine episodes of violence perpetrated by persons suffering 
from mental illness, as well as some successfully thwarted cases in which mentally ill 
persons had planned a violent attack but had been stopped by law enforcement 
intervention.  
A secondary question this research will consider is: Can clinical violence risk 
assessment instruments and the behavioral threat assessment model be synthesized into a 
guide for field use by law enforcement officers in order to aid assessing the risk for 
violence among persons suffering from mental illness? To answer this question, the 
33 Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (New York: Wiley and Sons, 
1996), 197–202. 
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research will explore both clinical risk assessment and behavioral threat assessment 
approaches to violence risk assessment and the feasibility of synthesizing components 
from each in order to develop a comprehensive model that has practical application for 
law enforcement officers in the field. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
In 2011, New Windsor, New York Police Chief Michael C. Biasotti conducted 
groundbreaking research into the impact of mental illness on law enforcement resources 
by conducting a survey of over 2,000 law enforcement executives while studying at the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Chief Biasotti 
demonstrated how the de-institutionalization of persons with serious mental illness has 
resulted in an exponential increase in law enforcement interaction with the mentally ill, 
drawing limited law enforcement resources away from both the traditional mission of 
crime-fighting, and its new role in homeland security.34 This research seeks to pick up 
where Chief Biasotti’s research left off by examining one of law enforcement’s primary 
roles in interacting with mentally ill persons in crisis: assessing dangerousness and the 
risk for violence. 
Though they are called upon regularly to assist mentally ill persons in crisis and 
assess their risk for violence, an examination of current best practices reveals that law 
enforcement officers are often ill equipped to conduct objective risk assessments of 
persons with mental illness. The purpose of this study is to prevent future violence by 
providing law enforcement personnel a tool for conducting more comprehensive violence 
risk assessments by synthesizing elements of the latest techniques in both clinical risk 
assessment and behavioral threat assessment research. By conducting a more accurate 
violence risk assessment, this thesis hypothesized that that law enforcement officers may 
increase the likelihood of treatment and reduce incidence of violence perpetrated by 
persons with mental illness. 
34 Michael C. Biasotti, “Management of the Severely Mentally Ill and its Effects on Homeland 
Security” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 84–86. 
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E. THESIS OUTLINE AND UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
Chapter II contains a review of pertinent literature that addresses several facets of 
the problem. It looks at the correlation between mental illness and violence, mass murder 
and active shooter events. In addition, the chapter includes an examination of existing 
law enforcement approaches to mental illness and risk assessments and clinical 
approaches to violence risk assessments, as well as sample case studies.  
Chapter III explains the research design, which is the application of clinical and 
BTA risk factors to select cases. Chapter IV then examines traditional law enforcement 
approaches to mental illness, including training and current threat assessment models. 
Chapter V contains four summary case studies for analysis. Two cases are of attacks 
perpetrated by mentally ill persons following contact with law enforcement, and two are 
of attacks planned by mentally ill persons but were thwarted following contact with law 
enforcement. Chapter VI examines a variety of common clinical tools for conducting 
violence risk assessments. Chapter VII identifies key clinical and BTA risk factors, and 
reconsiders the summary cases in light of these risk factors. Finally, Chapter VIII 
summarizes the research and proposes a new risk assessment guide for law enforcement 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this zeal for liberty, many hundreds of sick persons are annually 
deprived of the liberty of obtaining the medical treatment they require, 
obtaining in exchange only the liberty to commit suicide or homicide.35 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The mentally ill mass murderer is not a new phenomenon, but it is an important 
public safety issue that has come to the forefront of public discourse in the United States 
following the horrific shootings in Newtown, Aurora, Tucson, Washington D.C., and 
elsewhere. This thesis asks the question of whether or not law enforcement can help 
prevent violence and preempt mass murderer by conducting a more comprehensive 
violence risk assessment during contact with mentally ill persons in the field.  
This literature review is intended to examine the body of research, writing, and 
thought relating to the issues of mass murder, violence among the mentally ill, the 
behavioral threat assessment model, and other law enforcement approaches to assessing 
the risk for violence. It will also include a sampling of incidence of mass murder intended 
to identify missed warning signs and specific, tactical level intelligence that law 
enforcement could use to prevent an act of violence, perhaps even mass murder 
perpetrated by a person suffering from mental illness.  
To achieve this goal, it was necessary to examine and synthesize data from a 
broad range of publications and resources from several distinct disciplines and areas of 
research, as well as a sampling of mass murder events. Subsequently, this literature 
review is divided into the following six categories: 
1. Mental illness and violence 
2. Mass murder and active shooter events 
3. Clinical approaches to assessing the risk for violence 
4. Existing law enforcement approaches to risk assessment 
35 “Lunatics at Large and the Public Press,” Journal of Mental Science 44 (January 1898): 110, 
http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/44/184/110  
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5. Criminological approaches to mental health issues 
6. Summary case studies  
B. MENTAL ILLNESS AND VIOLENCE 
There is a significant amount of literature, research reports, and journals regarding 
the topic of mental illness and violence. Much of the literature examined for this project 
can be divided into three main categories: 1) studies that examine whether or not there is 
a causal relationship between mental illness and violence and what co-occurring factors 
may influence this phenomenon, 2) studies that examine the influence criminological and 
demographic factors have on the mentally ill and the likelihood for violence, and 3) 
research intended to assist clinicians in predicting the likelihood of violence among the 
mentally ill. 
When approaching the topic of mental illness and violence, it is common for 
many to assume a causal relationship between mental illness and violence. While the 
public may intuitively sense that the mentally ill are more violent than non-mentally ill 
persons, the research on this is somewhat divided. Some early studies suggested that 
mental illness was not associated with an increased likelihood for violence, however a 
preponderance of recent studies indicate that the likelihood of committing violence is in 
fact greater for people with serious mental illness than it is for those without.36 Table 1 







36 Silver, “Understanding the Relationship between Mental Disorder and Violence.” 
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Table 1.   Selected Studies Supporting Link between Mental Illness and 
Violence37 
Study Major Findings 
Swanson et al. (1990) Major mental disorders creates 5_ risk of violence 
Link et al. (1992) Patient groups 2–3_ more violent than nonpatient groups 
(when symptomatic); psychotic symptoms predict violence, 
even in nonpatient groups 
Hodgins (1992) Sweden birth cohort study: odds ratio (OR) = 4 for major 
mental disorder and violence 
Link and Stueve (1994) Violence predicted by three specific psychotic symptoms: 
threat, control, and override 
 
Swanson et al. (1996) 
Replicates Link and Stueve (1994) using Epidemiological 
Catchment area study data 
Link et al. (1998) Threat and control/override symptoms independently 
predict violence 
Tiihonen, Isohanni, Rasanen, Kioranen and Moring (1997) Finland birth cohort: OR = 7 for male schizophrenia and 
violence 
Hoptman et al. (1999) Dual diagnosis of schizophrenia and SA and thought 
disorder correlated with violence 
Swanson et al. (2000) Paranoid and threat/control-override (TCO) symptoms 
significantly associated with risk of violence 
McNeil et al. (2000) Among civil inpatients, command hallucinations created 
2.5_increase in violence 
Brennan, Mednick, & Hodgins (2000) Denmark birth cohort: OR = 4.6 for male schizophrenia 
and violence, 23 for female schizophrenia and violence 
Arsenault, Moffitt, Caspi, Taylor, and Silva (2000) New Zealand birth cohort: alcohol dependence (OR = 1.9), 
marijuana dependence (OR = 3.8), and schizophrenia –
spectrum disorders (OR = 2.5) each strongly related to 
violence 
 
Gray et al. (2003) 
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale score significantly 
correlated with inpatient violence 
Wallace, Mullen, and Burgess (2004) Australia birth cohort: Schizophrenia OR = 3.6–6.6 for 
various cohorts over 25-year period 
Beck (2004) Delusions present in half of cases of serious violence, most 
of TC type; but delusional violence uncommon in absence 
of SA history  
Swanson et al. (2006) Serious violence risk associated with higher positive 
symptom score and lower negative symptom score (on 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale) 
Teasdale et al. (2006) For males, threat delusions increase risk of violence 
 
 
There has been a tremendous amount of research done among clinicians regarding 
mental illness and violence. As a result of the deinstitutionalization of the severely 
mentally ill, which began following the Second World War, the question of how to 
manage the mentally ill and assess the risk they pose to the public has become an 
increasingly important one.38 Clinicians play a primary role in the assessment of the 
threat posed by mentally ill persons in order to determine if they should be released from 
37 Michael A. Norko, and Madelon V. Baranoski, “The Prediction of Violence; Detection of 
Dangerousness,” Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention 8, no. 1 (February 2008): 73–91.  
38 Torrey, The Insanity Offense, 1–2.  
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jail, or hospitalized involuntarily, to distinguish, in essence, with as much certainty as 
possible, between the dangerous and non-dangerous.39 To this end, numerous risk 
assessment tools and actuaries have been devised to assist clinicians in making such 
predictions. Recent studies point to success in predicting violence among the mentally ill 
when a broad range of factors in addition to psychopathy are examined. These added 
factors include age, gender, substance abuse, criminal history, and prior history of 
violence and aggression.40 
C. MASS MURDER AND ACTIVE SHOOTER EVENTS 
Most literature relating to the criminal offense of multiple-victim homicides 
appears to focus on serial killers. This is due in part to the prevalence of serial killer 
stories in the media, print, and in entertainment.41 What literature that can be found on 
the subject of mass murder is predominantly focused on school shootings, the politics 
surrounding gun control, and some discussion on the topic of keeping firearms from the 
mentally ill. This is due in large part to the appalling school shooting in Newtown, 
Connecticut, and the prevalence of mass murder/active shooter stories in the national 
media involving persons who appear to be suffering from mental illness.  
Sources of literature on the subject of mass murder are found in government 
publications, scholarly journals, and a few books. Another useful source of information 
on the topic of mass murder is a comprehensive study published in 2013 by a team of 
researchers at USA Today, Behind the Bloodshed, which attempts to catalogue every mass 
murder event in the United States.  
39 John Monahan et al., Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and 
Violence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 5. 
40 Mario Amore, Marco Menchetti, Christina Tonti, Fabiano Scarlatti, Eva Lundgren, William 
Esposito, and Domenico Berardi, “Predictors of Violent Behavior among Acute Psychiatric Patients: 
Clinical Study,” Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 62, no. 3 (June 2008): 247–255.  
41 David Schmid, Natural Born Celebrities: Serial Killers in American Culture (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005), 3. 
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Some work examines the various typologies of mass murders (coinciding with 
efforts to profile serial killers), with at least five distinct varieties being commonly 
identified:42 
1. the domestic killer 
2. the pseudo-commando 
3. the disgruntled or revenge killer 
4. the mentally ill or psychotic killer 
5. the political terrorist 
While mass murder committed by a mentally ill perpetrator has been described as 
“statistically rare and virtually unpredictable,”43 numerous other studies and authors 
refute this. In his 2006 article for the journal Law and Human Behavior, Dr. Eric Silver 
wrote: 
Although studies conducted prior to the 1980s seemed to suggest that 
mental disorder was not associated with violence the vast body of research 
conducted since that time…suggests a different conclusion. Specifically, 
recent work in this area indicates that although most people with major 
mental disorder do not engage in violence, the likelihood of committing 
violence is greater for people with a major mental disorder than for those 
without, and that substance misuse raises the risk of violence by people 
with mental disorder substantially.44 
Subsequently, this research will not seek to enter into the debate over whether or 
not there is an increased risk for violence among persons with mental illness. Rather, this 
research will examine specific cases of mass murder perpetrated by persons with mental 
illness in order to determine if there are common clues or signals that precede an attack. 
D. CLINICAL APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE RISK FOR VIOLENCE 
Over the past half century, there has been extensive clinical research into 
predicting violence among the mentally ill, particularly persons suffering from serious 
mental illnesses such as bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, and major depression. Clinical 
42 James A. Fox, and Jack Levin, Extreme Killing: Understanding Serial and Mass Murder (Los 
Angeles: Sage Publications, Ltd, 2012), 23.  
43 Daniel W. Webster, and Jon S. Vernick, Reducing Gun Violence in America: Informing Public 
Policy with Evidence and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 34. 
44 Silver, “Understanding the Relationship between Mental Disorder and Violence.” 
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violence prediction is an inexact science. Early actuarial and assessment tools and 
techniques, often referred to as “first-generation” studies, often produced results that 
were little better than chance.45 This body of research has grown tremendously in the past 
few decades, and the ability to predict violence in some persons has improved as well.  
This body of research has grown exponentially during the past two decades, due 
in large part to significant grants from the John D. and Catharine T. MacArthur 
foundation, and to Dr. John Monahan and his work on the MacArthur risk study. The 
MacArthur risk study was groundbreaking, and it began to shift the risk paradigm from a 
yes/no prediction to an assessment of risk based on degrees.46 Dr. Monahan’s work, 
including his books The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior, published in 1977,47 
and Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of mental Disorder and Violence, 
published in 2001,48 remain foundational to the field of clinical risk assessment. 
Though many clinicians have concluded that untreated mental illness does create 
a moderate increase in the risk for violence, mental illness is not the only factor that must 
be considered. A multivariate approach is necessary, and the most critical factors for 
predicting violence are co-occurring disorders of severe mental illness and substance 
abuse, coupled with a history of violence.49 Some clinicians and researchers have also 
begun to look at environmental and other factors that play a role in violence among all 
people, not just the mentally ill. A comprehensive approach to risk assessment for 
violence is critical to producing the most accurate assessment possible.  
45 Mairead Dolan, and Michael Doyle, “Violence Risk Prediction: Clinical and Actuarial Measures 
and the Role of the Psychopathy Checklist,” British Journal of Psychiatry 177 (2000): 303–311. 
46 Mary Alice Conroy, and Daniel C. Murrie, Forensic Assessment of Violence Risk: A Guide for Risk 
Assessment and Risk Management (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007), 7.  
47 John Monahan, Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior (New York, NY: Jason Aronson, Inc., 
1977). 
48 John Monahan, Henry J. Steadman, Eric Silver, Paul S. Appelbaum, Pamela Clark Robbins, Edward 
P. Mulvey, Loren H. Roth, Thomas Grisso, and Steven Banks, Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur 
Study of mental Disorder and Violence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
49 Eric B. Elbogen, and Sally C. Johnson, “The Intricate Link between Violence and Mental Disorder,” 
Archives of General Psychology 66, no. 2 (2009): 152–161. 
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E. LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO BEHAVIOR THREAT 
ASSESSMENT 
While clinicians have been researching the risk for violence among the mentally 
ill for decades, law enforcement agencies such as the United States Secret Service and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Behavioral Analysis Unit have also examined the 
problem.50 The Secret Service is a leader in this field; it has conducted two of the most 
comprehensive studies of pre-attack behavior under the guidance of forensic psychologist 
Robert Fein, PhD.51 
These studies found that most attackers typically engage in similar pre-attack 
planning, which can last for days or even months.52 Additionally, while the Secret 
Service literature asserts that there is no such thing as an attacker or assassin 
demographic profile, many attackers did share common characteristics. Interestingly, 
these characteristics, among others, include a history of social isolation, weapons use 
(though rarely a criminal history), explosive, angry behavior, serious depression or 
despair, and suicidal ideations.53 
While work done by the U.S. Secret Service is extremely useful to law 
enforcement, schools, and others, its research focused solely on 83 persons who, from 
1949 to 1996 attacked, or planned to attack public officials. Secret Service studies found 
that mental illness rarely played a key role in assassination behavior, and that 
assassination-type attacks, almost without exception, involved organized thinking and 
50 Work done by the FBI’s Behavior Analysis Unit focuses primarily on school and workplace 
shooters, and it relies heavily on the research done by Robert Fein and Bryan Vossekuil for the U.S Secret 
Service. 
51 Anna Miller, “Threat Assessment in Action,” Monitor on Psychology 45, no. (2014): 37. 
52 Robert A. Fein, and Bryan Vossekuil, Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: 
A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 
1998); Bryan Vossekuil et al., The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for 
the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States (Washington, DC: The United States Secret Service 
and the United States Department of Education, 2002). 
53 Robert A. Fein, and Bryan Vossekuil, Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A 
Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1998), 
12–13.  
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behavior prior to the attack.54 Subsequently, this research may not have direct application 
to the problem of the mentally ill mass murderer. 
F. CRIMINOLOGICAL APPROACH TO MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES  
The deinstitutionalization of persons suffering from severe mental illness has had 
a significant impact on law enforcement organizations across the country. 
Deinstitutionalization first resulted in an exponential increase in police contacts with 
mentally ill persons55 and frequent incarceration of persons with mental illness56. As a 
result, law enforcement agencies have struggled for decades to deal with the increasing 
numbers of mentally ill subjects found on the streets and in the neighborhoods and jails 
of every American city.  
In examining the literature, it becomes apparent that there are significant policy 
challenges facing law enforcement agencies as peace officers are the primary mental 
health care responders; yet, they are largely unprepared to deal with mentally ill people in 
crisis. This inadequacy to the task is primarily manifested in two ways: police reliance on 
violence when dealing with the mentally ill, and the high rates of incarceration of 
mentally ill persons, often referred to as “criminalization.”  
When called to deal with a non-criminal event in which a subject is exhibiting 
symptoms of mental illness, law enforcement officers operate under parens patriae, or 
the concept that the state has an obligation to care for citizens who are unable to care for 
themselves.57 In most states, this results in an officer making a determination as to 
whether or not the subject poses an imminent threat of danger to themselves or others.  
In recent years, an apparent increase in fatal encounters between law enforcement 
and persons suffering from mental illness have some law enforcement leaders and other 
54 Ibid., 13–16. 
55 J. C. Bonovitz, and J. S. Bonovitz, “Diversion of the Mentally Ill into the Criminal Justice System: 
The Police Intervention Perspective,” American Journal of Psychiatry 138, no. 7 (1981): 973–976.  
56 Linda A. Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest Rate of the Mentally Ill, 
American Psychologist 39, no. 7 (1984): 794–803. For more information on this topic, please refer to the 
NPS thesis completed by Chief Michael Biasotti.  
57 Conroy, and Murrie, Forensic Assessment of Violence Risk.  
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experts questioning whether law enforcement organizations are properly trained and 
equipped to deal with the problem effectively.58 Simultaneously, while police encounters 
with the mentally ill have increased, so have public expectations that peace officers be 
trained and equipped to deal with mentally ill persons in a humane and compassionate 
way. Crisis intervention teams (CIT), an approach to effectively handling the mentally ill 
created by the Memphis Police Department in the wake of a violent encounter with a 
mentally ill person, is one of the most successful and well-known efforts at training peace 
officers to better handle persons in crisis.59 
What is apparent from the literature in this field of study is that while there is an 
increased awareness of the challenges posed by the deinstitutionalization of persons with 
SMI, there remains a lack of research and resources aimed at equipping peace officers to 
assess the potential for violence among the mentally ill persons they encounter. Now, 
with a seemingly growing number of mentally ill persons committing widely publicized 
acts of mass murder, there appears to be a growing expectation that peace officers also 
improve in this fundamental public safety role as well. 
G. SUMMARY CASE STUDIES 
This research includes summary case studies of both completed mass murder 
events, and mass murders that were preempted by LEOs. This brief survey of several 
well-publicized cases will be conducted in order to analyze the presence or absence of 
warning signs or other indicators of dangerousness, what those indicators were, and the 
receptiveness of LEOs to those indicators, a research methodology first employed by Erik 
J. Dahl in his work on analyzing more traditional surprise attacks.60 Since this research is 
not designed to examine the response to active shooter/mass murder events, but potential 
58 Gary Fields, “Lives of Mentally Ill, Police Collide: Law-enforcement Professionals and Mental-
health Advocates Believe They Are Seeing an Increase in Fatal Encounters between Police and the 
Mentally Ill,” The Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2013, accessed June 18, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304561004579135623495179250 
59 Jines, “Crisis Intervention Teams: Responding to Mental Illness Crisis Calls.” 
60 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 68. 
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precursors to violence, this research will focus on the attacker’s background and their 
behavior antecedent to the attack.  
Summary case studies are based on open-sources and public information available 
in police reports, newspapers, scholarly journals, and other government documents and 
publications. Subsequently, cases have been selected based on the availability of 
adequate open-source information necessary to conduct the research and analysis.  
H. CONCLUSION 
There is tremendous literature regarding mental illness and violence and the law 
enforcement response to the challenge of dealing with persons suffering from mental 
illness. This thesis will seek to synthesize the literature and research from each of these 
disciplines in order to improve law enforcement risk assessment practices, increase 
treatment opportunities for those suffering from mental illness, and reduce violence 







III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Our present policy of discharging helpless human beings to a hostile 
community is immoral and inhumane. It is a return to the Middle Ages, 




While law enforcement has greatly increased its capacity to respond to an active 
shooter event and its grisly aftermath, many are now understandably calling on law 
enforcement organizations to intercede before the perpetrator can commit an act of 
murder.62 This notion of preventing an active shooter-mass murder event, whether 
perpetrated by a mentally ill subject or not, implies that there are adequate, discernable 
warning signs that can be observed and acted upon prior to the event. Unfortunately, law 
enforcement officers today approach their role in violence risk assessment without 
adequate training and often from a dichotomous “yes or no” perspective. This is not 
adequate, as clinicians have demonstrated that risk should be considered along a 
spectrum or scale from less to greater.  
In examining risk and precedent factors or behaviors, traditional intelligence 
theory suggests that “accurate information on what is about to transpire can always be 
found within the intelligence pipeline;”63 however, this conventional wisdom has 
recently been challenged. For example, Professor Erik J. Dahl, in his Theory of 
Preventive Action, postulates that there are two key factors necessary to prevent an 
attack. First, there must be precise warning with a near tactical level of specificity, and, 
second, there must be a high degree of receptivity with regard to the warning signs by 
61 Robert Reich, “Care of the Chronically Mentally Ill: A National Disgrace,” American Journal of 
Psychiatry 130 (1973): 911–912. 
62 James P. Gaffney, “Can Police Prevent an Active Shooting Incident?” Law Enforcement Today, 
April 2014, accessed May 6, 2014, http://www.lawenforcementtoday.com/2014/04/19/can-police-prevent-
an-active-shooting-incident/ 
63 James J. Wirtz, “The American Approach to Intelligence Studies,” in Handbook of Intelligence 
Studies, ed. Loch K. Johnson (London: Routlege, 2007), 51. 
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those in a position to act.64 Furthermore, Dahl suggests that the best way to analyze 
failures in stopping attacks is by comparing them to successfully preempted attacks.65  
In many instances of mass murder perpetrated by mentally ill persons, it is clear 
that there were warning signs that went unrecognized by peace officers and others who 
had contact with the attacker. Therefore, it is this framework of sufficient warning signs, 
signal receptivity, and the analysis of both failures and successes that will be used to 
explore specific cases of mass murder perpetrated by mentally ill persons and cases 
where mass murder was preempted. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the types 
of warning signs that existed prior to the events, as well as the level of receptivity by 
LEOs in a position to observe the warning signs.  
A secondary framework will be applied in the examination of warning signs and 
antecedent factors—that of the clinical risk assessment. Additionally, this framework will 
seek to divide warning signs into several distinct categories—demographic risk factors, 
clinical risk factors, historical risk factors, and contextual risk factors. Serious mental 
illness has been established as a moderate risk factor for violence, but mental illness is 
not the only factor that increases the risk for violence. Persons tasked with assessing the 
risk for violence in mentally disordered subject must also consider the typical 
criminological and contextual variables such as age, gender, criminal history, the 
contemporaneous occurrence of stressful life events, social disorganization, and the lack 
or presence of social controls to name a few.66  
B. ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE  
This thesis seeks a synthesis of divergent areas of study to address the issue of 
mental illness and mass murder. Subsequently, an examination was conducted into 
literature on the following topics: 
1. Mental illness and violence 
2. Mass murder and active shooter events 
64 Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, 2–4. 
65 Ibid., 15. 
66 Silver, “Understanding the Relationship between Mental Disorder and Violence.” 
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3. Clinical approaches to assessing the risk for violence
4. Law enforcement approaches to behavioral threat assessment
5. Criminological approaches to mental health issues
6. Sampling of both completed and thwarted mass murder events
It should be noted that while there has been extensive clinical research and much 
written on the correlation between mental illness and violence and the validity of clinical 
violence risk assessment tools, little research or writing has been done on the subject of 
violence risk assessment as it relates to law enforcement. The vast majority of law 
enforcement literature on the topic of mass murder and active shooter events focuses on 
response to such incidents and reveal recent calls for a focus on prevention. 
C. SUMMARY CASE STUDIES 
The object of this research is the phenomenon of mental illness and extreme 
violence in the form of mass murder active shooter events. The purpose of this research is 
not to explore the link between mental illness and violence (a subject about which 
considerable research has been conducted) and the correlation between mental illness and 
violence firmly established, given particular antecedent conditions.67 Instead, the purpose 
of this research is to examine cues or warning signs that precede an incident of extreme 
violence perpetrated by a mentally ill person, as well as current clinical approaches to 
violence risk assessment, in order to improve the practice of law enforcement risk 
assessment. 
To achieve this, the research will involve a comparison of deductively selected 
cases, and it is intended to explore the causal processes and identify conditional 
generalizations that can be used to help predict potential outcomes. These cases will 
include an examination of events where acts of extreme violence were successfully 
perpetrated by a mentally ill subject, as well as events in which acts of extreme violence 
were possible but were thwarted by law enforcement through intervention with particular 
attention paid to LEO receptivity of warning signs and indicators of dangerousness.  
67 Eric Silver, Mental Illness and Violence: The Importance of Neighborhood Context (New York: 
LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2001), 52;  
Torrey, The Insanity Offense, 142–143. 
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It should be noted that any attempt to develop a simple “attacker profile” would 
be insufficient for several reasons. For one, while traditional profile attributes such as age 
and gender are critical to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment, they do not provide 
the information necessary to develop a profile. Additionally, this research has determined 
that race or ethnicity appear to play no role in predicting dangerousness and the 
likelihood of extreme violence. Finally, traditional profiles do not take into consideration 
specific facts and circumstances that can contribute to dangerousness that are unique to 
each individual person, such as past history of violence and other criminological risk 
factors.  
It has been said that without generalization, foreknowledge is impossible.68 
Subsequently, cases have been selected and studied to obtain generalizable knowledge 
and empirical evidence that can then be applied to future law enforcement interactions 
with mentally ill subjects in order to better gauge dangerousness and the potential for 
violence. 
D. DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLING METHODOLOGY 
The data gathering process involved researching specific mass murder events in 
order to learn as much as possible about them. Data for sample cases was derived from 
primary sources, official reports, open source publications, public records, and 
established literature. Cases selected represent a purposive sample of mass murder events 
with particular emphasis placed on what was known about the perpetrator prior to the 
event. These cases were chosen based on the following criteria: 1) the event constituted, 
or likely would have constituted if successful, a mass murder of four or more persons as 
defined by the FBI; 2) the perpetrator was known or suspected to have suffered from a 
serious mental illness as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV);69 3) the perpetrator was contacted by law enforcement in the days, 
68 Henri Poincare, The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science, Science 
and Method (New York: The Science Press, 1913).  
69 See Appendix A for the DSM-IV definition of serious mental illness. American Psychiatric 
Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (Arlington, VA: American 
Psychiatric Publishing, 2000). 
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weeks, or months prior to the event taking place; and 4) there is sufficient information 
available in public records about the period of time preceding the event to facilitate the 
research. Subsequently, the sample cases selected for this research were chosen because 
of the amount of information available about them. Only four cases were selected for 
analysis in order to complete the research within the allotted time.  
The framework for the research into case samples consists of the following 
boundaries: 1) examination of the time antecedent to the attack, and 2) examination of 
information that was available to law enforcement officers through observation and 
standard investigative techniques. Moreover, the examination of case samples will 
specifically focus on the perpetrator’s criminal history, history of mental illness, contact 
with law enforcement, and the clinical and criminological risk factors that were, or 
should have been, apparent to law enforcement officers at the time of contact.  
While some argue that the nature, quality, and amount of the data relative to 
extreme acts of violence perpetrated by the mentally ill are insufficient to allow for 
explanatory statistical modeling and predictability,70 public safety officials must rely 
upon the observable facts and empirical evidence as they exist in order to anticipate the 
potential for violence and take reasonable action to prevent it. Several useful predictors of 
violence have been established through clinical research. These include history of past 
violence, age, gender, intelligence, psychiatric disorder and psychopathy, alcohol and 
drug abuse, and even adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) all influence the propensity 
for future violence.71 These will also be examined and compared to the findings in the 
case studies.  
At the conclusion the this research and analysis, the intended goal is to identify 
warning signs or precursors to violence in order to create a comprehensive field risk 
assessment tool that can be used by law enforcement officers and other first responders to 
help assess the risk for extreme violence posed by a particular individual. It is hoped that 
70 Jeffrey W. Swanson, “Explaining Rare Acts of Violence: The Limits of Evidence from Population 
Research,” Psychiatric Services 62, no. 11 (2011): 1369–1371. 
71 Leon Bakker, James O’Malley, and David Riley,  Storm Warning :  Statistical Models for Predicting 
Violence , Psychological Service New Zealand Department of Corrections, 1988, 
http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/665609/storm.pdf  
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the application of empirical data and logical reasoning to the endeavor of law 
enforcement risk assessments will result in better decision making and possibly preempt 
extreme violence among subjects suffering from serious mental illness. 
 28 
IV. POLICE TRAINING AND RESPONSE TO MENTAL ILLNESS
We must stop criminalizing mental illness. It’s a national tragedy and 
scandal that the L.A. County jail is the biggest psychiatric facility in the 
United States.  
—Elyn Saks 
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT’S ROLE IN ASSESSING RISK 
Law enforcement calls involving persons suffering from mental illness are on the 
rise nationally, and according to some estimates, these calls comprise between seven and 
10 percent of all police calls for service.72, In the majority of communities across the 
country, law enforcement is the first and often the only community resource that can be 
called upon to respond and address mentally ill persons in various stages of crisis.73 This 
places a significant public safety obligation upon law enforcement officers, as well as the 
duty to ensure that the mentally ill person receives proper care and treatment for his or 
her condition. 
As previously mentioned, the rationale for law enforcement intervention in non-
criminal situations involving mentally ill persons is derived from two common-law 
principles: the power and authority of police to protect the safety and welfare of the 
community and the state’s parens patriae duty to act on the behalf of citizens who are 
temporarily or permanently incapable of caring for themselves.74  
In most communities, a law enforcement officer’s options are quite limited when 
confronted with a mentally ill person. Historically, there have been three choices: arrest, 
72 “Law Enforcement and People with Severe Mental Illness,” Treatment Advocacy Center, accessed 
September 1, 2014, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/resources/consequences-of-lack-of-
treatment/jail/1385; Deane et al., “Emerging Partnerships.”  
73 H. Richard Lamb, Linda E. Weinberger, and Walter J. DeCuir, Jr., “The Police and Mental Health,” 




commit, or attempt to de-escalate.75 Today, law enforcement officers can typically 
choose from at least four courses of action:  
1. Arrest the person for a criminal offense 
2. Initiate an involuntary civil commitment 
3. Refer the person to outpatient services 
4. Resolve the matter informally 
Arresting a mentally ill person for a criminal offense assumes probable cause. 
This choice is also seen by many clinicians and advocates for the mentally ill as wrongly 
criminalizing the mentally ill person, who often would not have committed the offense if 
not for their mental illness.76 Additionally, some also view the incarceration of the 
mentally ill as a form of re-institutionalization, a shifting of the mentally ill from state-
run mental hospitals to state-run jails and prisons.77 Unfortunately, arrest is often 
necessary, if not the best choice in light of the circumstances faced and the options 
available to officers dealing with a mentally ill person who has committed a criminal 
offense.  
Another option is involuntary civil commitment or the admission of individuals 
against their will into a mental health unit for evaluation and treatment.78 Every state has 
distinct laws governing this process, but all of the state laws comply with rulings handed 
down by the United States Supreme Court in light of the Constitution. In the landmark 
case O’Connor v. Donaldson, the court established that states cannot confine a non-
dangerous person against their will, so long as they are capable of surviving safely by 
themselves or with the help of others—the presence of mental illness alone was deemed 
insufficient grounds for involuntarily committing a person.79  
75 Abigail S. Tucker, Vincent B. Van Hasselt, and Scott A. Russell, “Law Enforcement Response to 
the Mentally Ill: An Evaluative Review,” Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention 8, no. 3 (2008): 236–250, 
DOI:10.1093/brief-treatment/mhn014.  
76 Melissa Schaefer Morabito, “Horizons of Context: Understanding the Police Decision to Arrest 
People with Mental Illness,” Psychiatric Services 58, no. 12 (2007): 1582–1587. 
77 Gold, “Report: Jails House 10 Times More Mentally Ill than State Hospitals.” 
78 Ralph Reisner, Christopher Slobogin, and Arti Rai, Law and the Mental Health System: Civil and 
Criminal Aspects (Berkeley, CA: West Group, 2009), 704–705.  
79 John Parry, “Involuntary Civil Commitment in the 90’s: A Constitutional Perspective,” Mental and 
Physical Disability Law Reporter 18, no. 3 (1994): 320–336.  
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O’Connor v. Donaldson created the framework within which all state laws must 
function, establishing dangerousness to one’s self, or to others, as a near absolute 
requirement for an involuntary civil commitment.80 Subsequently, in most states an 
officer may initiate an involuntary commitment when he or she has probable cause to 
believe that a mentally ill person poses a danger to her or himself or others, is in need of 
treatment, or unable to care for her or himself adequately (these latter two criteria are 
ultimately components of an inability to care for one’s self). This allows for the detention 
of the person for up to 72 hours in order for a doctor or other health care professional to 
determine if involuntary commitment to a mental institution is necessary. 
The third option an officer has when dealing with a mentally ill person is that of 
referring the person to outpatient mental health care services or to a specialized acute care 
response team, such as the Los Angeles Police Department’s System-wide Mental 
Assessment Response Team (SMART) or Santa Barbara County’s Crisis and Recovery 
Emergency Services unit (CARES). This option is not available in all communities due to 
a lack of funding and professional personnel resources, but outpatient emergency services 
are on the increase nationally and have proven an effective tool in stabilizing persons in 
crisis and avoiding arrest.81 This is an important option that holds much promise for law 
enforcement, public safety, and the needs of persons suffering from mental illness, and 
therefore, it should be a priority for policymakers. 
The final option is an informal resolution in which the officer tries perhaps to 
temporarily mitigate a situation but takes no enforcement or other formal action. Informal 
resolution is the most frequent option chosen by law enforcement officers. This option 
frees the officer from being “tied-up” at the scene for a significant length of time and 
often relieves the officer of the responsibility of having to document his or her actions in 
written police report.82 
80 Ibid. 
81 Rob van den Brink et al., “Role of the Police in Linking Individuals Experiencing Mental Health 
Crises with Mental Health Services,” BMC Psychiatry 12, no. 171 (2012), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3511214/  
82 Linda A. Teplin, “Keeping the Peace: Police Discretion and Mentally Ill Persons,” National 
Institute of Justice Journal 244 (July 2000): 8–15.  
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According to a study conducted in 1980, researchers found that police calls for 
service involving mentally ill persons were resolved informally 72 percent of the time, a 
criminal arrest was made 16 percent of the time, and proceedings for an involuntary 
commitment were initiated 12 percent of the time.83 As already mentioned, referral to 
outpatient or other community treatment is a relatively new option not widely available at 
the time of the aforementioned study.  
B. MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE STATE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
TRAINING 
As discussed throughout this thesis, law enforcement officers are regularly called 
to incidents involving mentally ill persons. In these situations, the police function not 
only as public safety officers, but social workers, emergency health care responders, 
triage decision makers, inter-agency liaisons, and providers of transportation and other 
services.84 In spite of these demands and the liability inherent in dealing with persons 
with mental illness, most law enforcement officers receive little training to equip them for 
interaction with the mentally ill and even less training to equip them in conducting a risk 
assessment for potential violence. According to a study of 70 participating law 
enforcement agencies conducted in 2003, the median number of training hours for new 
recruits was 6.5 hours, while the median for in-service training was a paltry one-hour of 
training.85 Given the frequency and sheer volume of calls for service involving persons 
with mental illness, this is unacceptable, and it has opened many agencies up to public 
criticism, civil liability, and accusations of deliberate indifference with regard to the 
mentally ill.86  
83 EP Sheridan, and L. Teplin, “Police-referred psychiatric emergencies: advantages of community 
treatment,” Journal of Community Psychology 9, no. 2 (1981): 140–147. 
84 Wood et al., Police Interventions, 6. 
85 Judy Hails, and Randy Borum, “Police Training and Specialized Approaches to Respond to People 
with Mental Illnesses,” Crime and Delinquency 49, no. 52 (2003): 52–61.  
86 Michael S. Woody, “Dutiful Minds: Dealing with Mental Illness,” CIT International, January 6, 
2003, accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.citinternational.org/training-overview/129-dutiful-minds-
dealing-with-mental-illness.html  
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C. CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAMS AND OTHER APPROACHES 
In response to the challenges posed by persons with mental illness, most agencies 
have responded in one of four ways: 1) no specialized training or response to persons 
with mental illness; 2) police-based specialized police response, in which select officers 
receive specialized training in dealing with the mentally ill; 3) police-based specialized 
mental health response, in which mental health professionals are employed by an agency 
to provide consultations; and 4) mental-health-based specialized mental health response, 
which include cooperative agreements between police and mobile mental health crisis 
teams (MCTs) that operate independent of the law enforcement agency.87  
According to a study of law enforcement agencies typology of response 
conducted by Deane et al. in 1999, of 174 responding agencies,88 55 percent of the LEAs 
had no specialized response program. The results of this study can be found in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2.  Program Response Typology—Specialized Responses to Persons with 
Mental Illness.89 
87 Hails, and Borum, “Police Training and Specialized Approaches,” 54. 
88 Deane et al., “Emerging Partnerships,” 100. 
89 Deane et al., “Emerging Partnerships,” 100. 










                                                 
Now, nearly 15 years since this study was conducted, the police response to 
persons with mental illness is by far the most common. This is due primarily to more 
agencies recognizing the need for a specialized response to persons with mental illness 
and the relative cost effectiveness of this approach. By far the most popular police-based 
police response program is the crisis intervention team model. 
The first crisis intervention team was developed by the Memphis Police 
Department in 1987 following public outcry over the fatal police shooting of a 27-year-
old mentally ill man armed with a knife.90 Now, crisis intervention teams (CITs) are 
sweeping the country and can be found in most major cities from San Francisco, 
California, to Albuquerque, New Mexico, to Washington, D.C., with dozens of other law 
enforcement agencies implementing similar programs.91  
Consisting of 40-hours of specialized training designed to assist law enforcement 
officers confronted with a mentally ill person in crisis, CIT is considered to be the most 
comprehensive law enforcement mental health training program in the country.92 
Additionally, while most agencies that adopt CIT cannot afford the time or resources to 
train all officers, most agencies try to train enough personnel to ensure there is at least 
one CIT trained officer on duty at all times.93 
The CIT approach to handling mental illness essentially focuses on three goals: 1) 
training officers to recognize mental illness and de-escalate situations involving mentally 
ill persons in crisis; 2) forging partnerships between law enforcement and mental health 
care providers; and 3) reducing the number of mentally ill persons arrested and booked 
into jails. The CIT approach offers training for everyone connected with the response to 
mentally ill persons in crisis, from call-takers and dispatchers, to mental health care 
90 Betsy Vickers, Memphis, Tennessee Police Department’s Crisis Intervention Team, Practitioners 
Perspectives (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000), accessed August 26, 2014, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182501.pdf  
91 Hails, and Borum, “Police Training and Specialized Approaches,” 59. 
92 Megan Pauly, “How Police Officers Are (or Aren’t) Trained in Mental Health,” The Atlantic, 




                                                 
providers, to jail officers, but its primary focus is to equip patrol personnel to better 
handle the unique challenges of dealing with a mentally ill person. The weeklong 
curriculum is well regulated and must cover the following subjects:  
CIT Patrol Officer 40-Hour Comprehensive Training Curriculum:94 
1) Didactics and Lectures/Specialized Knowledge
• Clinical Issues Related to Mental Illnesses
• Medications and Side Effects




• Suicide Prevention and Practicum Aspects
• Rights/Civil Commitment
• Mental Health Diversity
• Equipment Orientation
• Policies and Procedures
• Personality Disorders
• Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD)
• Legal Aspects of Officer Liability
• Community Resources
2) On-Site Visits and Exposure
• On-Site Visits
3) Practical Skill Training/Scenario Based
• Crisis De-Escalation Training Part I
Basic Strategies 
• Crisis De-Escalation Training Part II
Basic Verbal Skills 
• Crisis De-Escalation Training Part III
Stages/Cycle of a Crisis Escalation 
• Crisis De-Escalation Training Part IV
94 DuPont et al., Crisis Intervention Team Core Elements. 
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Advanced Verbal Skills 
• Crisis De-Escalation Training Part V 
Advanced Strategies: Complex Scenarios 
As can be clearly seen in the CIT curriculum, principal emphasis is placed on 
advocacy, mental health care services, and violence avoidance through de-escalation. 
While these are important elements of an agency’s approach to dealing with persons with 
mental illness, the critical responsibilities of public safety and violence risk assessment 
are strikingly absent from the training.  
In spite of these shortcomings, the 40-hour CIT program represents the gold 
standard in law enforcement training for dealing with mentally ill persons. An alarming 
study published in 2003 found that among 84 agencies surveyed, a median of 6.5 hours of 
specialized training was provided to new recruits, and only one hour of training was 
provided for in-service personnel.95 
D. LAW ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION AND RISK ASSESSMENT  
Law enforcement officer discretion, or the process of how an individual officer 
decides what enforcement action to take in a particular instance, has long been a topic of 
discussion and study. In 1967, Egon Bittner published a significant study of police officer 
discretion and interaction with the mentally ill. Furthermore, Bittner identified three 
domains that he termed “horizons of context” that affect police decisions regarding 
whether or not to arrest a person with mental illness, as shown in the Figure 3.96  
95 Hails, and Borum, “Police Training and Specialized Approaches,” 52. 
96 Egon Bittner, “Police Discretion in Emergency Apprehension of Mentally Ill Persons,” Social 
Problems 14, no. 3 (1967): 278–292. 
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Figure 3.  Horizons of Context—Inclusive Elements that Help to Explain the 
Police Decision to Arrest People with Mental Illness.97 
The scenic horizon includes several environmental factors that tend to influence 
the person suffering from mental illness. These include the law enforcement agency’s 
norms, policies, and approach to persons with mental illness, the community’s baseline 
for “normal deviance” (or an estimate of how much disorder a particular community will 
traditionally tolerate), the officer’s workload, and specific environmental factors affecting 
the mentally ill person, such as the presence or absence of a stable family and home-life 
that could serve to support and monitor the person.98 In addition, the temporal horizon 
includes police knowledge that expands beyond the specific incident. Factors found 
within the temporal horizon include specific officer characteristics, such as specialized 
training and experience, the characteristics of the person in crisis, such as age, gender, or 
a history of substance abuse, and the specific mental health needs of the person.99 
The manipulative horizon includes factors that are based on the immediate 
situation at hand. These include the severity of the offense or situation, the immediate 
behavior of the person, time constraints (whether real or artificial) and the availability of 
options, which range from arrest, to an informal disposition, to a referral to a treatment 




                                                 
center, or, in rare situations, to call a CIT or other specialized forensic mental health team 
to respond.100  
Bittner’s observations and research regarding police discretion and the process of 
deciding whether to arrest or not, is informative. Moreover, they can be used to examine 
police decisions following both completed violent events, and those that were thwarted. It 
also illustrates the complexity in examining police discretion.  
E. BEHAVIORAL THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND THE MENTALLY ILL 
During the 1990s, Robert A. Fein, a clinical psychologist with the U.S. Secret 
Service, and Bryan Vossekuil, a special agent with the Secret Service, conducted the 
Exceptional Case Study Project, which employed an incident focused, behavior-based 
approach analyzing 83 persons known to have engaged in 73 incidents of assassination, 
near assassination, or attack on public officials from 1949 to 1995.101 There findings, 
published in 1998 and titled Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment 
Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, established that 
while there was no profile of the typical assassin, there were common, discernable 
process of attack-related thinking and behavior in targeted violence that could be 
observed, and acted upon.102 As a result of their research, Fein and Vossekuil identified a 
list of questions to ask while conducting a threat assessment of possible targeted violence 









                                                 
Table 2.   U.S. Secret Service “Questions to Ask in a Threat Assessment”103 
I. Has the subject shown an interest in any of the following? 
• Assassins or assassination. 
• Weapons (including recent acquisition of a weapon). 
• Militant or radical ideas/groups. 
• Murders, murderers, mass murderers, and workplace 
• Violence and stalking incidents. 
II. Is there evidence that the subject has engaged in menacing, 
harassing, and/or stalking-type behaviors? Has the subject 
engaged in attack related behaviors? These behaviors combine an 
inappropriate interest with any of the following: 
• Developing an attack idea or plan. 
• Approaching, visiting, and/or following the target. 
• Approaching, visiting, and/or following the target with a 
weapon. 
• Attempting to circumvent security. 
• Assaulting or attempting to assault a target. 
III. Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving 
command hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution, 
etc., with indications that the subject has acted on those beliefs? 
IV. How organized is the subject? Does the subject have the ability to 
plan and execute a violent action against a target? 
V. Is there evidence that the subject is experiencing desperation 
and/or despair? Has the subject experienced a recent personal loss 
and/or loss of status? Is the subject now, or has the subject ever 
been, suicidal? 
VI. Is the subject’s “story” consistent with his or her actions? 
VII. Are those who know the subject concerned that he or she might 
take action based on inappropriate ideas? 
VIII. What factors in the subject’s life and/or environment might 
increase or decrease the likelihood that the subject will attempt to 
attack a target (or targets)? 
 
 
The work done by Fein and Vossekuil has served as the foundation for further 
behavioral threat assessment research, which includes an examination of school and other 
103 Robert A. Fein, and Bryan Vossekuil, Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment 
Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials (Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Justice, 1998). 
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active shooter events. This has led to the development of a more expansive list of 
warning behaviors:104 
1. Pathway warning behaviors
2. Fixation warning behaviors
3. Identification warning behaviors
4. Novel aggression warning behaviors
5. Energy burst warning behaviors
6. Leakage warning behaviors
7. Last resort warning behaviors
8. Direct threat warning behaviors
But while there are similarities, behavioral threat assessments differ from the violence 
risk assessment law enforcement is expected to conduct when dealing with a mentally ill 
person in crisis in regards to the goals, context, process, structure, and, most importantly, 
time horizon.105 Furthermore, behavioral threat assessments are aimed at persons who are 
at some point along a path of targeted violence against a specific target, whereas violence 
risk assessments attempt to assess the likelihood of violence posed by a mentally ill 
person, against anyone, as well making a determination as to how soon that violence 
might occur. 
F. CLASSICAL APPROACH TO RISK ASSESSMENT 
Another consideration is the classical approach to risk assessment adopted by the 
Department of Homeland Security for counter-terrorism infrastructure protection. This 
simple formula determines the level of risk by examining the probability that the 
perpetrator would attack, the probability that the perpetrator would be successful, and the 
consequence of a successful attack in persons likely killed or injured. This model is 
expressed as the equation, R = T x V x C and is used primarily within the Department of 
Homeland Security for infrastructure and asset protection against terrorist threats. 
However, this method of risk assessment is not ideal for a number of reasons, foremost 
104 J. Reid Meloy, and Jens Hoffmann, International Handbook of Threat Assessment (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 39–40. 
105 Ibid., 13. 
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being the intrinsic subjectivity and ambiguity of establishing a numeric value for such 
concepts as threat, vulnerability, and consequence, especially by law enforcement 
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V. SUMMARY CASE STUDIES 
People with mental problems are almost never dangerous. In fact, they are 
more likely to be the victims than the perpetrators. At the same time, 
mental illness has been the common denominator in one act of mass 
violence after another.  
—U.S. Senator Roy Blunt 
 
A. WASHINGTON NAVY YARD 
During the early morning hours of August 6, 2013, Naval Station Newport Police 
received several calls from the Navy Gateway Inns & Suites regarding a noise complaint. 
The front desk clerk requested police respond for fear that a guest, who was behaving 
very strangely, might hurt someone. Naval Station Newport Police responded, and 
officers met with a distraught man who had taped a microphone to the ceiling of his room 
in order to record the voices of people that he believed were following him.  
The man, identified as 34-year-old Aaron Alexis, was a U.S. Navy veteran trained 
in aviation electronics and recently employed by a military sub-contractor because of his 
training and security clearance. However, Alexis was a deeply troubled person. His 
aggressive behavior in the military had resulted in a general discharge for misconduct, 
and he had recently sought help at a Veteran’s Administration Hospital for acute 
insomnia.106 Those closest to Alexis described him as a “13-year-old stuck in a 34-year-
old body” and an alcoholic with a fierce temper, who carried a gun with him wherever he 
went.107  
Now, at the Navy Gateway Inns & Suites, Alexis was clearly in distress; he had 
dismantled his bed, fearing someone was hiding beneath it. He told officers that he feared 
that “they” might have implanted a chip in his head. Naval Station Newport officers tried 
106 Theresa Vargas, Steve Hendrix, and Marc Fisher, “Aaron Alexis, 34, is Dead Gunman in Navy 
Yard Shooting, Authorities Say,” The Washington Post, September 17, 2013, accessed August 12, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/aaron-alexis-34-is-dead-gunman-in-navy-yard-shooting-
authorities-say/2013/09/16/dcf431ce-1f07-11e3-8459-657e0c72fec8_story.html 
107 Ibid.  
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to calm Alexis, but they eventually cleared the call without taking any action, having 
determined Alexis was not a threat or in need of “immediate care or treatment.”108  
One day later, on the morning of August 7, 2013, Newport, Road Island Police 
were dispatched to a routine, low-priority call of harassment at the Marriott Hotel. Upon 
arrival, they too met with Alexis. He again displayed signs of paranoid delusions and told 
police that people whom he could hear talking through the walls of his room were 
following him. Additionally, Alexis explained to the officers that the people had been 
sent to harass him and to keep him from sleeping by using a microwave to send 
vibrations through his body. Finally, a desperate and delusional Alexis told the officers 
that he was afraid and feared that these people were planning to hurt him. 
The officers surmised that Alexis was delusional and likely suffering from some 
form of mental illness; however, the Newport Police officers also cleared the call without 
taking any action. Instead, they advised Alexis to stay away from the people, whom the 
officers clearly believed did not exist and told him to call again should he have any 
contact with them. The officers then wrote a half-page report documenting the incident 
and submitted it to a sergeant who forwarded the report on to the Naval Station Newport 
Police as a courtesy due to the man’s occupation.109  
Less than six weeks later, on September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis entered the 
Washington Navy Yard at 8:20 in the morning, carrying a concealed sawed-off shotgun, 
a rifle, and a semi-automatic handgun. Alexis proceeded to shoot 16 people, killing 12 of 
them before he was finally shot and killed by responding officers. 
B. ISLA VISTA, CALIFORNIA 
On July 21, 2013, Santa Barbara County sheriff’s deputies responded to the 
Goleta Valley Cottage Hospital for a battery report. Upon arrival, they met with the 
victim, a 21-year old man named Elliot Rodger who claimed he had been battered while 
108 U.S. Department of the Navy, Report of the Investigation into the Fatal Shooting Incident at the 
Washington Navy Yard on September 16, 2013 and Associated Security, Personnel, and Contracting 
Policies and Practices, November 8, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Navy-Investigation-into-the-
WNY-Shooting_final-report.pdf  
109 Newport Police Department report 13-17827, August 7, 2013. Internal document. 
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at a party in Isla Vista, California. Described as “timid, and shy” by officers, Rodger did 
not display any overt signs of mental illness; however, during the course of the 
subsequent investigation, the deputies learned that Rodger had actually tried to push two 
women from a 10-foot balcony while at the party, prompting the altercation.110 Deputies 
also learned from witnesses that Rodger was behaving “strangely” while at the party, and 
he did not appear to be socializing with anyone. Deputies closed the case without any 
further follow-up or action.111 
On April 30, 2014, Rodger was again contacted by deputies from the Santa 
Barbara Sheriff’s Department, along with a University of California, Santa Barbara 
police officer, and a dispatcher in training. This time, officers arrived at Rodger’s home 
after receiving a call from a county mental health care worker and therapist to the young 
man,112 expressing fear and alarm over his behavior and disturbing videos that he had 
posted on YouTube indicating suicidal and homicidal ideations.113 Deputies, who spoke 
to Rodger at the door of his residence, again described a timid and shy young man with 
no obvious signs of mental illness. Deputies did not look at the disturbing videos that had 
prompted the call, nor did they ask to go inside the residence, nor take any other 
reasonable investigative steps to learn more about this young man.114 
On May 23, 2014, Rodger executed the murder spree that he had been planning 
for months. When it was over, Elliot Rodger had killed six and wounded 13 before taking 
his own life. In the aftermath of Rodger’s murderous rampage, Santa Barbara Sheriff Bill 
Brown told reporters that it was “very, very apparent that he [Rodger] was severely 
110 Santa Barbara Sheriff’s Office report 13-10081, July 21, 2013. Internal document.  
111 Ibid. 
112 Suman Varandani, “California Police Knew of Elliot Rodger’s Disturbing Videos Days before His 
Shooting Spree but Did Not Watch Them,” International Business Times, May 30, 2014, accessed August 
25, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/california-police-knew-elliot-rodgers-disturbing-videos-days-his-
shooting-spree-did-not-1592327 
113 “Virgin Killer’s Parents Read His Hate-filled Manifesto then Called the Police and Rushed to Stop 
him When They Heard of Murder Spree on Their Car Radio,” Mail Online, May 25, 2014, accessed August 
25, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2639177/Parents-shooter-read-manifesto-driving-stop-
son-heard-massacre-radio-revealed-investigators-search-moms-house.html  
114 Varandani, “California Police Knew of Elliot Rodger’s Disturbing.” 
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mentally disturbed.”115 In spite of this observation, the sheriff went on to announce that 
the deputies who responded had handled the call in a professional manner “consistent 
with state law and department policy.”116 In the months following the Isla Vista mass-
murders, a spokeswoman for the Santa Barbara Sheriff’s Department struggled to explain 
how Rodgers did not pose an “immediate threat,” leaving deputies no choice under state 
law but to clear the call without taking any action or making any referral.117  
C. DE ANZA COLLEGE 
On January 29, 2001, 19-year-old college student Al DeGuzman arrived at the 
Longs Drug Store on Berryessa Road in San Jose California to pick up the photographs 
he had left a day earlier to be developed. He provided the clerk with his receipt, and 
waited for her to retrieve his photos. While waiting for the clerk to return, two officers 
with the San Jose Police Department approached DeGuzman from the back of the store. 
DeGuzman, spooked, tried to walk away, but was quickly detained by the officers before 
he could leave the store.118 
The clerk, an 18-year-old college student at San Jose State, had developed 
DeGuzman’s role of film earlier that day and was deeply troubled by what she saw. 
Images of DeGuzman posing with weapons and pipe bombs prompted the clerk to call 
the police and report what she had seen. The clerk would later tell reporters, “The anger 
in his face scared me.”119 Police responded in time to intercept DeGuzman at the photo-
lab. During a subsequent search of DeGuzman’s home, police found four rifles, a sawed-
off shotgun, 30 pipe bombs, 20 Molotov cocktails and 2,000 rounds of ammunition, a 
115 “Gunman Emailed Plans to Parents before Rampage,” Chicago Tribune, May 26, 2014, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-05-26/news/chi-santa-barbara-shooting-20140525_1_isla-vista-uc-
santa-barbara-childhood-friend  
116 Joshua Molina, “Elliot Rodger and a Call for Help,” Mission and State, June 4, 2014, accessed 
August 25, 2014, http://www.missionandstate.org/homepage-layout/featured-story-center/elliot-rodger-call-
help/  
117 Ibid. 
118 Alex Ionides, “This Boy’s Plan,” Metroactive, January 31, 2002, accessed August 26, 2014, 
http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/01.31.02/cover/deguzman-0205.html  
119 John M. Glionna, and Rebecca Trounson, “Man Accused of Bombing Plot Hated Everyone,” Los 
Angeles Times, February 1, 2001.  
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map of De Anza College marked with locations where he planned to plant the bombs, and 
a tape recording outlining his plot to attack the school.120  
In the days following his arrest, police learned that DeGuzman had been planning 
to attack De Anza College for years, was obsessed with Columbine killers Eric Harris 
and Dylan Klebold, and was only one day away from carrying out his plans when he was 
arrested.121 DeGuzman had no prior arrest record and was a good student, who was well 
liked by all who knew him; however, DeGuzman suffered from major depression and 
suicidal ideations from the age of 15. He was never treated for the disorder.122 
DeGuzman was later found guilty on 108 felony chargers and sentenced to 80 years in 
state prison. On Monday, August 9, 2004, Al DeGuzman committed suicide by hanging 
himself in his Folsom State Prison cell.123 
Acting on nothing more than some suspicious photographs, a drug store clerk and 
a couple of police officers prevented what would have certainly been another school 
shooting. Why did these officers handle this call the way they did? In a city of more than 
a million people, it would not have been surprising for the officers to resolve the matter 
informally—to simply interview DeGuzman, and, as in the case of Elliot Rodgers, let the 
quiet, unassuming young man go without searching his home or digging beneath the 
surface to uncover his murderous plot. 
D. GARDNERVILLE, NEVADA 
On Monday, March 11, 2013, the Douglas County Communications Center in 
Minden, Nevada received a call on the non-emergency line at 3 a.m. from a woman who 
reported that her 27-year-old son had left a note stating, “Mom, you need to call the 
120 Maria Alicia Guara, Matthew B. Stannard, and Stacy Fin, “De Anza College Blood Bath Foiled—
Photo Clerk Calls Cops,” SF Gate, January 31, 2001, accessed June 28, 2014, 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/De-Anza-College-Bloodbath-Foiled-Photo-Clerk-2957361.php  
121 Glionna, and Trounson, “Man Accused of Bombing Plot Hated Everyone.” 
122 Alex Ionides, “DeGuzman Trial Delayed,” LaVoz Weekly, November 13, 2001, accessed August 
26, 2014, http://lavozdeanza.com/uncategorized/2001/11/13/deguzman-trial-delayed/  
123 “Man Who Planned Massacre at De Anza College Commits Suicide,” SF Gate, August 9, 2004, 
accessed August 26, 2014, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Man-who-planned-massacre-at-De-Anza-
College-2702611.php  
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police. I’m seriously thinking about killing these people.”124 The caller explained that her 
son was delusional and that he was hearing voices that were telling him to kill their 
neighbors.125 The caller further reported that her son suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia, slept with a loaded AR-15 rifle, and had previously threatened to kill her 
with scissors.126 The caller refused to give her name or location, and deputies on patrol 
that morning were unable to identify or locate the caller. 
Given the strange nature of the call and the potential for serious violence, 
investigators chose to follow-up on the call the next day. From clues left by the caller 
while talking on the phone, specifically her son’s first name, his therapist’s name, and the 
fact that he recently been incarcerated in the Douglas County Jail, investigators identified 
the caller and her son Michael Tom. Investigators conducted a check of Tom’s criminal 
history and prior contacts with law enforcement and found numerous reports dating back 
a decade that included two involuntary civil commitments for mental illness, four reports 
of domestic battery, and one arrest for possession of a firearm while under the influence 
of alcohol and marijuana.127  
Thus informed, investigators went to Tom’s residence and upon arrival met with 
Tom’s family, who were initially reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement. Family 
members expressed concerns that Tom needed psychiatric help, not incarceration in jail. 
Investigators likewise expressed their concerns for Tom, his family, and the community. 
Tom’s mother was eventually persuaded to talk to investigators, although his father 
remained uncooperative throughout the investigation. According to Tom’s mother, Tom 
was paranoid and believed the neighbors were conspiring against him and harassing him. 
She further stated that Tom has been abusing alcohol, and she was unsure if he was 
taking the medications he was prescribed to treat his schizophrenia.128 In addition, Tom’s 
mother told investigators that he had recently begun to hear voices and see people that 
124 Sheila Gardner, “Man Accused of Threatening Neighbors,” The Record Courier, March 29, 2013 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 




                                                 
did not really exist. She also told investigators that Tom gets violent when he is in one of 
these “altered” states, and that she was afraid of him.129 
Investigators eventually interviewed Tom himself. Tom told investigators that he 
had been drinking alcohol, and that he was schizophrenic. In addition, Tom told 
investigators that his neighbors were “out to get him” and later stated he heard voices 
telling him to kill his neighbors before they killed him. Tom admitted that he had been 
sleeping with a loaded AR-15 rifle for the last month for protection from his neighbors. 
An AR-15 rifle and a semi-automatic handgun were seized from Tom’s bedroom and 
taken for “safekeeping.” Furthermore, Tom was taken into custody, and investigators 
initiated the application process for an emergency involuntary civil commitment. 130  
Investigators, working in conjunction with the District Attorney’s Office, 
convinced a judge to use an obscure Nevada law to require Tom to post a bond as surety 
to keep the peace.131 Since Tom had technically not yet violated any law, law 
enforcement officials were unable to prevent Tom’s firearms from being returned to him. 
However, by requiring Tom to post surety to keep the peace, he was forced to sell his 
firearms in order to raise the surety. Tom was also placed under the supervision of the 
Department of Alternative Sentencing and forbidden from obtaining or possessing 
firearms as a condition of his release.132 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 NRS 170.040, Intervention of officers of justice by requiring surety to keep peace, states, “Public 
offenses may be prevented by the intervention of the officers of justice by requiring surety to keep the 
peace.” Nevada Law Library, “Nevada Revised Statutes,” Carson City, Nevada, accessed June 17, 2013. 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-170.html  
132 “Bail Reduced for Man who Threatened Neighbors.” The Record Courier, April 13, 2013. 
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VI. CLINICAL VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT  
I had noticed that both in the very poor and very rich extremes of society 
the mad were often allowed to mingle freely.133 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the deinstitutionalization of persons suffering from severe mental illness 
nearly half a century ago, clinicians have been increasingly called upon to assess the 
potential risk for violence posed by mentally ill persons. Most often, these clinical risk 
assessments for violence are used within the framework of the legal system in order to 
inform decisions regarding the sentencing, parole, application of the death penalty, civil 
commitment, and discharge from custody of persons having or suspected of having some 
form of mental illness.134 
More recently, in the wake of numerous studies and years of research, the way 
mental health professionals view and conduct risk assessments has changed significantly: 
Conceptually, there has been a shift from the violence prediction model, 
where dangerousness was viewed as dispositional (residing within the 
individual), static (not subject to change) and dichotomous (either present 
or not present) to the current risk assessment model where dangerousness 
or ``risk'' as a construct is now predominantly viewed as contextual 
(highly dependent on situations and circumstances), dynamic (subject to 
change) and continuous (varying along a continuum of probability).135 
The importance in this shift from a dichotomous, dispositional view of risk to a 
more comprehensive, contextual view of risk cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, to the 
limited degree law enforcement officers perform risk assessments in the field, they are 
predominantly dichotomous in nature—the persons contacted currently pose a risk to 
themselves or others, or they do not. As we have seen from the case samples, this 
simplistic approach is not sufficient to prevent acts of violence. 
133 Charles Bukowski, Ham on Rye (Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press, 1982). 
134 Conroy, and Murrie, Forensic Assessment. 
135 Borum et al., “Threat Assessment,” 323–337. 
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Mental health care practitioners today have at their disposal two primary methods 
for conducting violence risk assessments—clinical, and actuarial. Clinical risk 
assessment is the method historically used by mental health professionals to assess the 
risk for violence in persons with mental illness. The clinical approach involves the 
clinician’s professional judgment based on the synthesis and analysis of test data, 
interview information, and historical data and is a relatively unstructured approach 
allowing the clinician to consider anything he or she believes is relevant to the 
assessment.136  
On the other hand, actuarial approaches to violence risk assessment rely on 
statistical formulas and are described by some as being more evidence based and 
objective. Actuarial models seek to minimize the judgment and discretion of the clinician, 
which some argue can be flawed and subjective and relies on the insertion of gathered 
data into a pre-existing equation, which provides a consistent and objective assessment of 
risk.137  
So, in essence, clinical assessments tend to be subjective and experiential, while 
actuarial assessments are statistical in nature. But no approach is without its flaws, and, 
as Randy Otto observes, the clinical and actuarial approaches need not be mutually 
exclusive: 
I recommend that clinicians use a combined approach whereby they 
familiarize themselves with the empirical literature regarding risk factors 
for violent behavior and structure their inquiry and judgments around 
these factors.138 
While there is ongoing debate within the clinical field as to which method is 
preferred, what is important to note is that there have been numerous studies and risk 
assessment tools developed by clinicians over the past several decades. Furthermore, 
though clinical violence risk assessment is an evolving field of study with somewhat 
mixed results, what has been conclusively established is that: 1) violence does occur with 
136 Randy Otto, “Assessing and Managing Violence Risk in Outpatient Settings,” Journal of Clinical 




                                                 
some degree of frequency among persons with mental illness; 2) that persons with certain 
mental disorders and symptom clusters are more likely to engage in violent behavior than 
persons without such; and 3) mental health professionals have some ability to assess the 
risk for violence among persons with mental disorder.139 As no single risk assessment 
instrument has emerged as the definitive tool for predicting violence,140 this research will 
consider three of the more prominent models.  
B. MACARTHUR VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY 
The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study (VRAS), made public in April 
2001, is the result of nearly 10 years of research into the problem of accurately assessing 
the risk for violence among the mentally ill. The study was led by University of Virginia 
Professor John Monahan, with financial support from the MacArthur Foundation, and 
had the goal of providing clinicians accurate statistical information on the empirical 
relationships between various risk factors and subsequent violent behavior.141 
According to the VRAS, risk factors are broken into four primary categories: 
personal or demographic risk factors, historical risk factors, contextual risk factors, and 
clinical risk factors. The VRAS identified a number of risk factors as being significantly 
related to violence, given in Table 3.  
139 Ibid. 
140 Arthur J. Lurigio, and Andrew J. Harris, “Mental Illness, Violence, and Risk Assessment: An 
Evidence-Based Review,” Victims and Offenders 4 (2009): 341–347. 
141 The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health 
and the Law, 2001, accessed May 28, 2014, http://macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html  
 53 
Table 3.   Major Violence Risk Factors MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment 
Study142  
Prior arrests 
Seriousness    
Frequency 
Demographic    
Age (-)  
Male    
Unemployed 
Child abuse    
Seriousness    
Frequency 
Diagnosis    
Antisocial PD    
Schizophrenia (-)  
Father     
Used drugs    
Home until 15 (-) 
Other Clinical    
Substance Abuse    
Anger control    
Violent fantasies    
Loss of consciousness    
Involuntary status 
 
The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study measured 134 risk factors for 
violence in a population sample of 1,136 persons between the ages of 18 and 40, of 
diverse ethnicity, who were admitted to acute civil inpatient facilities in select cities in 
Pennsylvania, Missouri, and Massachusetts.143 Participants in the study were assessed for 
risk of violence and following release were monitored for violence for 20 weeks. At the 
conclusion of the study, the following risk factors were found to be significantly related 
to violence:144  
Gender. Men were somewhat more likely than women to be violent, but 
the difference was not large. Violence by women was more likely than 
violence by men to be directed against family members and to occur at 
home, and less likely to result in medical treatment or arrest. 
Prior violence. All measures of prior violence—self-report, arrest records, 
and hospital records—were strongly related to future violence. 
142 Ibid.  
143 MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law, “The MacArthur Violence Risk 




                                                 
Childhood experiences. The seriousness and frequency of having been 
physically abused as a child predicted subsequent violent behavior, as did 
having a parent—particularly a father—who was a substance abuser or a 
criminal. 
Neighborhood and race. While there was an overall association between 
race and violence, African Americans and whites that lived in comparably 
disadvantaged neighborhoods had the same rates of violence. 
Diagnosis. A co-occurring diagnosis of mental illness or personality 
disorder and substance abuse was strongly predictive of violence. 
Psychopathy. Psychopathy,145 as measured using Hare’s PCL-R 
Psychopathy Checklist, was more strongly associated with violence than 
any other risk factor studied.  
Paranoid Delusions. The presence of delusions was not associated with 
violence, however a generally “suspicious” attitude toward others was   
Hallucinations. Voices specifically commanding a violent act increase the 
likelihood of violence. 
Violent thoughts. Thinking or daydreaming about harming others was 
associated with violence, particularly if the thoughts or daydreams were 
persistent. 
Anger. The higher a patient scored on the Novaco Anger Scale in the 
hospital, the more likely he or she was to be violent later in the 
community.146 
While highly accurate compared to other approaches, the VRAS is also much 
more computationally complex and involves five tree-based prediction models, each 
assessing numerous risk factors. 147 Subsequently, the VRAS typically requires software-
based administration and scoring and does not lend itself to use in a field setting. 
145 Dr. Robert Hare describes psychopathy as “a cluster of personality traits and socially deviant 
behaviors glib and superficial charm, egocentricity; selfishness, lack of empathy, guilt, and remorse, 
deceitfulness and manipulativeness; lack of enduring attachment to people, principles, or goals; impulsive 
and irresponsible behavior, and a tendency to violate explicit social norms.” Tom Chivers, “Psychopaths, 
How Can You Spot One?” The Telegraph, April 6, 2014, accessed June 28, 2014, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/10737827/Psychopaths-how-can-you-spot-one.html?fb  
146 Ibid. 
147 The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study. 
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C. HISTORICAL, CLINICAL, RISK MANAGEMENT-20 
The Historical, Clinical, Risk Management (HCR-20) is a clinical tool that was 
developed in 1995 through consideration of empirical literature concerning factors related 
to violence. The HCR-20 was designed to integrate the experience of clinicians, and 
simplify the administration, and interpretation of the results.148 In addition, the HCR-20 
provides clinicians with 20 violence risk factors, broken down into ten past risk factors, 
five present risk factors, and five future risk factors, which must be considered when 
assessing the risk for violence. See Table 4. 
148 “HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme: Overview and Annotated Bibliography,” University 






Table 4.   HCR-20 Assessment Items 
A. Historical Items 
1. Previous violence 
2. Young age at first violent incident 
3 Relationship instability 
4 Employment problems 
5 Substance use problems 
6 Major mental illness 
7 Psychopathy 
8 Early maladjustment 
9 Personality disorder 
10 Prior supervision failure 
B. Clinical Items 
1 Lack of insight (into mental disorder) 
2 Negative attitudes (toward others, institutions, social agencies, the law) 
3 Active symptoms of major mental illness 
4 Impulsivity 
5 Unresponsive to treatment 
C. Risk Management Items 
1 Plans lack feasibility 
2 Exposure to destabilizers (e.g., weapons, substances, potential victims) 
3 Lack of personal support 
4 Noncompliance with remediation attempts 
5 Stress 
 
Possibly the most widely used and best validated violence risk assessment tool, 
the HCR-20 provides practitioners a simple framework for conducting clinical violence 
risk assessments, exemplifying the “structured professional judgment” model of risk 
assessment.149 The HCR-20 approach seems well suited for adaptation to law 
enforcement use and field deployment.  
D. VIOLENCE RISK APPRAISAL GUIDE  
The Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) is an actuarial tool developed in 
1993 by researchers working at a Canadian maximum-security hospital, and has been 
widely used to predict risk of violence in mentally disordered offenders with a history of 
149 “About HCR-20,” accessed December 26, 2014, http://hcr-20.com/about/  
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violence.150 The VRAG is comprised of 12-item scale, which includes the Hare 
Psychopathy checklist to develop a numeric score for assessing risk: 
1. Lived with both biological parents to age 16 (except for death 
of parent) 
Score no if offender did not live continuously with both biological parents 
until age 16, except if one or both parents died. In the case of parent death, 
score as for yes. 
Yes [-2] 
No [3] 
This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
2. Elementary school maladjustment (up to and including Grade 
8) 
No problems [-1] 
Slight or moderate discipline or attendance problems [2] 
Severe (i.e., frequent or serious) behavior or attendance problems (e.g., 
truancy or disruptive behavior that persisted over several years or resulted 
in expulsion) [5] 
This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
3. History of alcohol problems 
Allot one point for each of the following: alcohol abuse in biological 
parent, teenage alcohol problem, adult alcohol problem, alcohol involved 
in a prior offense, alcohol involved in the index offense. 
 
0 points [-1] 
1 or 2 points [0] 
3 points [1] 
4 or 5 points [2] 
This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
4. Marital status (at time of index offense) 
Ever married (or lived common law in the same home for at least 6 
months) [-2] 
Never married [1] 
This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
5. Criminal history score for convictions and charges for 
nonviolent offenses prior to the index offense 
Score of 0 [-2] 
Score of 1 or 2 [0] 
Score of 3 or above [3] 
This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
150 Grant T. Harris et al., “A Multisite Comparison of Actuarial Risk Instruments for Sex Offenders,” 
Psychological Assessment 15, no. 3 (2003): 413–423. 
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Offense       (Score) / Number 
Robbery (bank, store)      (7)   0 
Robbery (purse snatching)     (3)   0 
Arson and fire setting (church, house, barn)   (5)   0 
Arson and fire setting (garbage can)    (1)   0 
Threatening with weapon, dangerous use / pointing firearm (3)   0 
Threatening (Uttering threats)    (2)   0 
Theft (Grand Larceny)     (5)   0 
Mischief to public or private property over a   (5)   0 
Break and enter and commit indictable offense (burglary) (2)   0 
Theft (petit larceny)      (1)   0 
Mischief to public or private property under b  (1)   0 
Break and enter      (1)   0 
Fraud (extortion, embezzlement)    (5)   0 
Fraud (forged check, impersonation)    (1)   0 
Possession of a prohibited or restricted weapon  (1)   0 
Procuring a person for or living on the avails of prostitution (1)   0 
Trafficking in narcotics     (1)   0 
Dangerous driving, impaired driving    (1)   0 
Obstructing a peace officer (including resisting arrest) (1)   0 
Causing a disturbance      (1)   0 
Wearing a disguise with the intent to commit an offense (1)   0 
Indecent exposure      (2)   0 
6. Failure on prior conditional release 
(includes parole violation or revocation, breach of or failure to comply 
with recognizance or probation, bail violation, and any new charges, 
including the index offense, while on a conditional release) 
No [0] 
Yes [3] 
This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
7. Age at index offense 




<= 26 [2] 
This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
8. Victim injury 
Death [-2] 
Hospitalized [0] 
Treated and released [1] 
None or slight (includes no victim) [2] 
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This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
9. Any female victim 
(for index offense) 
Yes [-1] 
No (includes no victim) [1] 
This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
10. Meets DSM-III criteria for any personality disorder 
No [-2] 
Yes [3] 
This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
11. Meets DSM-III criteria for schizophrenia 
Yes [-3] 
No [1] 
This item cannot be scored due to lack of information 
12. Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised score 
(PCL-R; Hare, 1991) 





>= 35 [12] 
E. HARE’S PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST - REVISED  
The Hare psychopathy checklist was developed by Canadian psychologist Robert 
Hare over the course of several decades beginning in the late 1970s. Revised in 1991, the 
Hare psychopathy checklist—revised (PCL-R) is widely used to diagnose psychopathy, 
measure anti-social behavior, and assess the potential for violence in forensic 
populations. Considered by some to be the best predictor of violent behavior, the PCL-R 






HARE’S PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST151 
FACET I—Interpersonal 
• glib and superficial charm 
• grandiose estimation of self 
• pathological lying 
• cunning and manipulative 
• sexual promiscuity 
FACET II—Affective 
• shallow affect (superficial emotional responsiveness) 
• callousness and lack of empathy 
• lack of remorse or guilt 
• failure to take responsibility for actions 
• many short-term marital relationships 
FACET III—Lifestyle 
• need for stimulation/proneness to boredom 
• parasitic lifestyle 
• impulsivity 
• irresponsibility 
• lack of realistic long-term goals 
FACET IV—Antisocial 
• poor behavioral controls 
• early behavior problems 
• juvenile delinquency 
• revocation of conditional release 
• criminal versatility 
 
F. ASSESSING IMMINENCE—DYNAMIC APPRAISAL OF SITUATIONAL 
AGGRESSION  
With regard to assessing the imminence of violence, this study revealed little 
existing literature or research on the topic. Imminence is a legal burden placed on some 
law enforcement officers by state law. In other words, some states limit law enforcement 
officers and other professionals from intervening on behalf of a mentally ill person in 
crisis unless the risk they pose for violence is imminent. However, imminence, or the 
notion that violence is impending or forthcoming, is a relatively ambiguous notion. While 
151 Jennifer L. Skeem et al., “Psychopathic Personality: Bridging the Gap between Scientific Evidence 
and Public Policy,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 12, no. 3 (2011): 95–162. 
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some states do require an element of imminence, many do not, though the misconception 
that they do is widespread. According to the Treatment Advocacy Center: 
The most pervasive myth in American mental health may be the notion 
that imminent risk of violence or suicide is the sole permissible basis for 
hospital commitment. The myth persists even in states with the most 
progressive commitment standards and among the gatekeepers to 
mandatory treatment, such as law enforcement officers responding to 
psychiatric crisis calls who determine whether to transport an individual to 
a hospital for evaluation. And most tragically, it is the sort of myth that 
becomes true in the retelling.152 
In considering how then to assess the imminence of violence, at least one study 
suggests that while static risk factors are useful in assessing future risk for violence, it is 
the dynamic risk factors that are most useful in gaging the imminence of violence.153 One 
significant model has been developed to aid clinicians in making this assessment. The 
dynamic assessment of situational aggression (DASA), a seven-item structured 
professional judgment instrument, is intended to assist clinicians in assessing imminent, 
short-term risk for violence (violence that is expected to occur within 24 hours).154  
The seven DASA risk factors, developed by incorporating risk factors from other 
clinical tools including the HCR-20, include: 
1. Irritability 
2. Impulsivity 
3. Unwillingness to follow directions 
4. Sensitivity to perceived provocation 
5. Easily angered when requests denied 
6. Negative attitudes 
7. Verbal threats 
152 Brian Stettin et al., “Mental Health Commitment Laws: A Survey of the States,” Treatment 
Advocacy Center, February 2014, accessed January 26, 2015, 
http://www.tacreports.org/storage/documents/2014-state-survey-abridged.pdf.  
153 James R. P. Orgloff, and Michael Daffern, “The Dynamic Appraisal of Situational Aggression: An 
Instrument to Assess Risk for Imminent Aggression in Psychiatric Inpatients,” Behavioral Sciences and the 
Law #24 (2006): 799–813. DOI: 10.1002/bsl.  
154 David Canter, and Rita Zukauskiene, Psychology and Law: Bridging the Gap (Burlington, CA: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 200. 
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Of these seven items, irritability, impulsivity, verbal threats, and negative 
attitudes were most indicative of impending aggressive behavior.155 It bears noting that 
the DASA model was developed in the context of a highly controlled, inpatient hospital 
setting. Subsequently, in other settings and contexts there are likely other risk factors, 
such as evidence that the subject is planning or preparing to commit a violent act, which 
could be useful in gauging the imminence of violence. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Over the past 30 years, mental health professionals have made great strides in 
improving the accuracy of violence risk assessment instruments, and have identified a 
number of reliable risk factors for violence.156 In particular, the MacArthur VRAS, the 
HRC-20, and the DASA are useful tools, components of which could be easily adapted 




155 Orgloff, and Daffern, “Dynamic Appraisal,” 810 
156 Conroy, and Murrie, Forensic Assessment, 15. 
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VII. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Precautions are always blamed. When successful, they are said to be 
unnecessary. 
—Benjamin Jowett 
A. SELECT CLINICAL RISK FACTORS 
Many of the clinical risk factors examined in Chapter VI lend themselves quite 
readily to field use by law enforcement; some do not. Several clinical risk factors were 
selected for consideration for use by law enforcement personnel in the field based on 
three criteria: 1) is the clinical risk factor pertinent to assessing the risk for violence, and 
2) is the data sought readily available to officers in the field through normal investigative 
techniques, and 3) can the data sought be obtained, interpreted, and understood by law 
enforcement personnel, or does it require special training in psychology or other related 
field. The following clinical risk factors (listed in the subsections below), which were 
found to meet these three criteria, were selected.  
(1) Gender 
Men are responsible for 85–90 percent of violent behavior everywhere in the 
world.157 This applies to all males, not just those afflicted with mental illness. 
Subsequently, gender is a significant risk factor that bears considering in any violence 
risk assessment. While women who suffer from mental illness do commit murder at a 
higher rate than women who do not suffer from mental illness,158 analysis of all reported 
mass murder events in the United States in 2013 found that 96 percent were male. 
(2) Age  
Age is also a demonstrable risk factor for violence. The very young and the very 
old are less likely to commit acts of violence. Analysis of all reported mass murder events 
in the United States in 2013 revealed that the median age of a mass murderer was 27 and 
157 Torrey, The Insanity Offense, 182.  
158 Ibid. 
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the mean age was 33. That is not to say that the very young, and the very old never 
commit acts of mass murder, but such cases are statistically rare.  
(3) Prior Violent Acts  
Prior violence is the best predictor of future violence and should be investigated 
thoroughly and thoughtfully considered by officers conducting a risk assessment. 
(4) Diagnosed with SMI  
As stated earlier in this paper, the presence of a serious mental illness means a 
moderate increase in the likelihood for violence. This risk for violence increases 
exponentially if the person is not being treated, is not compliant with prescribed 
treatments, or has a co-occurring disorder such as drug or alcohol dependency.  
(5) Lack of Family/Other Support  
The presence of friends, family, or other care providers should be considered in 
risk assessment for violence. This support structure can help ensure compliance with 
medications or other prescribed treatment, and it can also take steps to prevent violence 
or call authorities when a person suffering from mental illness is in crisis or otherwise 
posing a risk to themselves or others. 
(6) Unresponsive To or Not Compliant with Prescribed Treatment  
Unresponsiveness or non-compliance with medications or treatment can result in 
an elevated risk for violence and should be factored into any risk assessment.  
(7) Active Symptoms  
In addition to a diagnosis of SMI, the manifestation of active symptoms, which 
include but are not limited to, severe anxiety, confused thinking, extreme mood changes, 
detachment from reality, delusions, hallucinations, anger, and suicidal or homicidal 
thoughts,159 should be considered during an assessment for violence. 
 
159 “Mental Illness Symptoms—Diseases and Conditions,” The Mayo Clinic, accessed January 8, 
2015, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/mental-illness/basics/symptoms/con-20033813  
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(8) Paranoid Delusions  
Paranoid delusions, especially those resulting in suspicion towards others or fear 
that others intend to harm the person in question has been related to an increased risk for 
violence. 
(9) Violent Thoughts  
Persistent violent thoughts, thinking, or daydreaming about committing violent 
acts or harming others has been associated with an increased risk for violence.  
(10) Command Hallucinations or Voices  
The manifestation of command hallucinations or voices, especially those that 
instruct the person to commit acts of violence, have been associated with an increased 
risk for violence by both clinical and behavioral threat assessment researchers and should 
be explored and considered during a risk assessment. 
(11) Anger and Irritability  
Obviously, anger is strongly associated with violence and is a key risk factor that 
should be considered when conducting a violence risk assessment. Anger and irritability 
can also indicative of the imminence of violence as well, although irritability may be 
difficult for law enforcement to assess in the confines of a field contact. 
(12) Recent Loss/Stressor  
Both clinical and behavior threat assessment research into violence has found that 
a recent loss, such as the loss of a job or spouse or a similar significant stressful event, 
can increase the risk for violence against self or others and should be considered when 
conducting a risk assessment. 
(13) Access to Weapons  
Access to weapons alone may not indicate an increased risk for violence; however 
the presence of weapons, especially firearms, should be taken into consideration by 
investigating officers. Officers can choose to temporarily seize firearms or other weapons 
for short-term safekeeping and return them once the person is no longer in crisis.  
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(14) Substance Abuse  
The abuse of drugs or alcohol, especially if co-occurring with a serious mental 
illness, has been shown to increase the risk for violence among persons suffering from 
SMI. 
Three significant clinical and criminological risk factors were not selected for law 
enforcement use in the field. These risk factors are psychopathy (as measured by Hare’s 
Psychopathy Checklist), neighborhood context, and history of adverse childhood 
experiences (ACE), such as child abuse and parental substance abuse. Though all three of 
these factors are associated with an increased risk for violence, these risk factors would 
arguably require specialized training, be difficult for officers to accurately assess, or 
require too much time for officers to assess in the field. 
B. SELECT BEHAVIORAL THREAT ASSESSMENT AND OTHER RISK 
FACTORS 
The following are selected risk factors from BTA, or represent good investigative 
practices, and should be considered during a risk assessment (some of these BTA risk 
factors, such as threatened violence, are also clinical risk factors as well): 
(1) Prior Suicide Attempts  
Prior suicide attempts may be a good indicator of current or future suicidal 
ideation, and they should be considered when conducting a risk assessment. 
(2) Criminal History and Local Arrest Record  
Criminal history and local arrest or contact records should always be examined 
when assessing risk for violence as past behavior is a strong indicator of future behavior. 
(3) History of Weapons Offenses  
Prior weapons offenses, including weapons offenses that do not necessarily 
involve violence (e.g., discharging a firearm, unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon, 
possession of a dangerous weapon) might be indicative of future violence and should be 
considered during a risk assessment. 
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(4) Prior Involuntary Civil Commitment  
Prior involuntary civil commitments may be indicative of previous danger to self, 
or others, and should be considered during any subsequent risk assessment.  
(5) Fascination with Weapons, Murder, or Murderers  
Behavioral threat assessment research conducted by Fein and Vossekuil has 
indicated that a fascination with weapons, murder or violence, assassins, or other 
infamous murderers  
(6) Planned, Threatened, or Attempted Violent Act  
Threatened or attempted violence should, quite obviously, factor in to any risk 
assessment. Officers conducting a violence risk assessment must also take time to search 
for signs that violence has been threatened or is being planned. This might include 
verbalized threats or plans, written threats or plans, electronic files, email, or postings on 
social media or other medium. Indicators such as planned or threatened violence are also 
key indicators for assessing the imminence of violence. 
(7) Impulsive and/or Unwilling to Comply with Directions  
Impulsivity and refusal to comply with orders or directions has been linked to 
both violence as well as the possible imminence of violence and should be considered 
when conducting a risk assessment. 
(8) Actual Violence  
In cases where the subject has committed a violent act against his or herself, 
officers, or other persons at the scene, there can be no question of the dangerousness 
posed by that person and action must be taken to protect the person and others. 
C. ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE CASES BY APPLYING A CLINICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT FRAME  
As demonstrated in Chapter VI, mental health care practitioners and researchers 
have developed several tools that have been demonstrated to be quite accurate in 
assessing the risk for violence among the mentally ill. A retrospective examination of the 
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previous case samples discussed in Chapter IV will now be conducted in light of these 
clinical and BTA risk factors beginning with completed attacks, followed by the thwarted 
attacks. 
1. Washington Navy Yard  
Aaron Alexis, the Washington Navy Yard (WNY) shooter, met the demographic 
risk factors for violence, since he was a male under the age of 50. Alexis also met many 
of the historical risk factors, such as a criminal history, including two arrests for offenses 
committed with a firearm, and a history of substance abuse (alcohol). Alexis’s criminal 
history information would have been readily available to officers called to make an 
assessment. Alexis manifested several clinical risk factors, as he was obviously suffering 
from a serious mental illness (paranoid and delusional). Alexis’s behavior was so strange, 
in fact, that it prompted two separate calls to police from parties concerned that he might 
hurt someone. Several significant contextual risk factors were also readily discernable, 
given that Alexis was alone, away from home, and lacked family or other support 
systems. Furthermore, Alexis had both a fascination with and access to firearms, as 
demonstrated by his involvement in two previous shooting incidents. Finally, Alexis 
demonstrated several “imminent” risk factors for violence associated with his delusional 
paranoia and extreme anxiety. All of this information was either readily available to 
police or could have been obtained through a cursory investigation. Unfortunately, the 
officers on scene either failed to recognize the warning signs or were not receptive to 
them. While a different course of police action during their contact with Alexis on 
August 6 and 7, 2013 may not have prevented the subsequent deadly shooting at the 
Washington Navy Yard, it is reasonable to conclude that had police initiated an 
involuntary commitment, or at the very least notified Alexis’s family or employer, Alexis 
likely would have received badly needed mental health care, and the chain of events 
leading to the shooting might have been disrupted. 
2. Isla Vista, California  
Elliot Rodger, the University of California Santa Barbara (UCSB) shooter, met 
the demographic risk factors of age and gender. It has also been argued that Rodger, 
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while not officially diagnosed with any serious mental illness, did in fact present clear 
symptoms of both psychopathy and psychosis, including paranoid delusions.160 Rodger 
had a record of prior contact with law enforcement, including an incident in which he 
attempted to push two women off of a balcony. In addition, Rodger had posted both 
suicidal and homicidal thoughts on social media sites. Moreover, Rodger was in fact 
planning a violent attack, and he had access to weapons. The failure of law enforcement 
officers to seriously consider the threat posed by Rodger is now well known. Had officers 
conducted a more comprehensive risk assessment, it is likely Rodger’s plan would have 
come to light and his attack on UCSB could have been thwarted. Santa Barbara sheriff’s 
deputies cited California Penal Code 5150 and its “imminence” clause as one reason for 
not doing more to stop Elliot Rodgers. This code, which regulates the detention of a 
“mentally disordered person” for treatment, is similar in content to many other state laws 
and more liberal than some. California Penal Code 5150 states in part: 
When any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to 
himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a peace officer, member of the 
attending staff, as defined by regulation, of an evaluation facility 
designated by the county, designated members of a mobile crisis team 
provided by Section 5651.7, or other professional person designated by the 
county may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person 
into custody and place him or her in a facility designated by the county 
and approved by the State Department of Social Services as a facility for 
72-hour treatment and evaluation. …When determining if probable cause 
exists to take a person into custody, or cause a person to be taken into 
custody, pursuant to Section 5150, any person who is authorized to take 
that person, or cause that person to be taken, into custody pursuant to that 
section shall consider available relevant information about the historical 
course of the person's mental disorder if the authorized person determines 
that the information has a reasonable bearing on the determination as to 
whether the person is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or is 
gravely disabled as a result of the mental disorder. For purposes of this 
section, "information about the historical course of the person's mental 
disorder" includes evidence presented by the person who has provided or 
is providing mental health or related support services to the person subject 
to a determination described in subdivision (a), evidence presented by one 
or more members of the family of that person, and evidence presented by 
160 Peter Langman, “Elliot Rodger: A Psychotic Psychopath?” Psychology Today, May 28, 2014, 
accessed January 8, 2015, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/keeping-kids-safe/201405/elliot-rodger-
psychotic-psychopath  
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the person subject to a determination described in subdivision (a) or 
anyone designated by that person.161 
As can be seen from California Penal Code 5150, there is no requirement that the 
dangerousness posed by the mentally ill person be immediate or imminent, as is often 
assumed. Had deputies investigated further, they would have undoubtedly uncovered 
evidence of Rodger’s impending attack (Rodgers later wrote in his “Day of Retribution” 
manifesto that when the deputies appeared at his house, he feared they would search his 
room and uncover his plot, writing “I thought it was all over”162). The lack of 
intervention by Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s deputies called to Elliot Rodger’s house 
was not so much out of obedience to the law, which prevented them from taking action 
but a failure in officer discretion—a failure to recognize warning signs, or to investigate 
the facts and circumstances sufficiently to either confirm, or rule out the presence of 
dangerousness. Worse, Santa Barbara County has a specialized unit staffed by mental 
health care professionals, known as the Crisis and Recovery Emergency Services 
(CARES), which responds to assist persons in crisis. Deputies did not call this team to 
assist with an assessment, however, because they were not receptive to the initial warning 
signs, having failed to ascertain the imminent threat that Rodgers actually presented. 
3. DeAnza College  
As a young male, Al DeGuzman fit the demographic risk profile. DeGuzman also 
met clinical risk factors, as a troubled young man who suffered from an untreated serious 
mental illness in the form of major depression. In addition, DeGuzman struggled with 
suicidal ideations from adolescence and ultimately committed suicide while incarcerated, 
a manifestation of a significant historical risk factor. Moreover, DeGuzman manifested 
contextual risk factors, displaying a fascination with, and access to weapons—both 
firearms and improvised explosive devices. Not only that, but he was also fascinated by 
161 California law, section 5150, Regs Today, accessed August 25, 2014, 
http://ca.regstoday.com/law/wic/ca.regstoday.com/laws/wic/calaw-
wic_DIVISION5_PART1_CHAPTER2.aspx  
162 Adolfo Flores, Richard Winter, and Kate Mather, “Deputies Didn’t Know Elliot Rodger had 
Firearms before Deadly Rampage,” LA Times, May 30, 2014, accessed June 12, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-elliot-rodger-guns-sheriff20140530-story.html 
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the Columbine killers and engaged in violent thoughts and fantasies that led him to plan a 
murderous attack on De Anza College. Finally, DeGuzman demonstrated imminent risk 
factors in his violent thoughts and elaborate plans to attack DeAnza College. Fortunately 
for the students of De Anza College, the San Jose police officers called to Longs Drug 
Store, where the photos of DeGuzman posing with his weapons had been developed, 
were receptive to the initial warning signs and conducted the necessary investigation to 
reveal the scope of the threat. 
4. Gardnerville, Nevada  
As a male in his twenties, Michael Tom also met the demographic risk factors. 
Tom had significant historical and clinical risk factors, with several documented episodes 
of domestic violence, and a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Not only had Tom had 
been involuntarily committed for mental health treatment on at least two occasions he 
also suffered from paranoid delusions and heard command voices telling him to kill his 
neighbors. Contextually, Tom had both access to and an intense fascination with 
weapons, and he kept an AR-15 rifle with him in his home at all times of the day and 
night. In assessing the imminence of violence, Tom met all of the risk factors and was 
often angry, regularly experienced violent ideations, and often threatened to harm those 
around him. Responding officers recognized the warning signs, were receptive to the 
warning signs, and conducted a thorough investigation, which resulted in the removal of 
firearms from the residence and treatment for Tom. 
D. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
The WNY and Isla Vista cases are illustrative for several reasons. First, they 
reveal the flawed “yes/no” dichotomous approach typically used by officers in the field 
when assessing dangerousness. Second, they reveal a critical lack of unawareness of the 
warning signs and risk factors for violence, which demonstrates that law enforcement 
officers desperately need a tool to assist them with conducting more comprehensive risk 
assessments.  
In addition to proving that law enforcement can prevent acts of mass murder, the 
DeAnza College and Gardnerville, Nevada cases are demonstrative of two more things 
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critical in any law enforcement risk assessment of a person with mental illness. First, law 
enforcement officers must be willing to take the time necessary to conduct a 
comprehensive risk assessment. Second, law enforcement officers must be able to see 
beyond the surface and recognize the potential for harm. In other words, there must be a 
high level of receptivity to the warning signs revealed as a result of an investigation. This 
inquisitiveness and receptivity was markedly absent in the law enforcement contacts 
leading up to both the WNY and Isla Vista shootings. 
Returning to Dahl’s Theory of Preventive Action, in order to prevent a surprise 
attack, there must be precise, tactical level warning signs, and there must be a high level 
of receptivity toward the warning signs on the part of those in a position to intervene and 
to act in order to interrupt the pathway to violence.163 In the first two cases, there was a 
failure of receptivity to the information that was available, a failure to consider what was 
possible, and failure to investigate a little further to uncover those tactical level warning 
signs. In the end, these officers failed in their duty to conduct a risk assessment—to 
conceptualize the potential future dangerousness of the individual standing before them. 
By contrast, officers involved in the DeGuzman case demonstrated a high degree of 
receptivity to the initial warning signs, which prompted them to look further into the 
situation. 
A re-examination of the sample cases in light of both BTA and clinical risk 
assessment models demonstrates that in the cases where the perpetrator completed an 
attack there were clear warning signs that law enforcement officers, if properly trained 
and equipped, could had recognized and acted to interrupt the chain of events. Data from 
the prologue case (Carson City IHOP shooter Eduardo Sencion) has been included for the 
purpose of comparison and analysis (see Table 5). 
163 Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, 23. 
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Table 5.   Analysis of Perpetrators and Risk Factors 
 
 
As Table 5 illustrates, the perpetrators in each of the four cases manifested 
numerous risk factors, many of which were, or should have been, apparent to officers and 
sufficient to warrant further investigation and intervention. In re-examining the sample 
cases, it becomes clear that a more robust, comprehensive risk assessment can and should 
be adapted from clinical and behavioral threat assessment models for use by law 
enforcement in the field. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
It is far better to foresee even without certainty than not to foresee at all. 
—Henri Poincare, The Foundations of Science, 1913 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
A growing body of evidence now suggests that a particular subgroup of persons 
with serious mental illness is significantly more dangerous than person in the general 
population, and law enforcement officers are often called upon to fulfill the role of 
gatekeeper—deciding if a person with mental illness should enter the mental health care 
system, or the criminal justice system.164 These factors place a significant public safety 
obligation upon law enforcement officers and a duty to ensure that mentally ill persons 
receive proper care and treatment for their condition. 
Society clearly expects law enforcement officers to be adequately equipped to 
address the needs of the mentally ill and to take reasonable steps to ensure public safety. 
This expectation may be inferred from the fact that citizens routinely call upon law 
enforcement for assistance with mentally ill persons and from the simple fact that there is 
often no other resource that can be called upon to respond at such times. Considering law 
enforcement’s ever-increasing volume of calls involving persons with mental illness, its 
duty to protect the safety and welfare of the community and its parens patriae obligation 
to safeguard those who are unable to care for themselves, law enforcement officers must 
be better equipped to fulfill these essential roles.  
This research asserts that in spite of this increasing responsibility and role with 
regards to the mentally ill, law enforcement personnel are inadequately trained and 
equipped to conduct even rudimentary violence risk assessments. Most startling, this 
research reveals an apparent lack of receptivity to warning sings among many LEOs. As 
illustrated by the Aaron Alexis and Elliot Rodger cases, law enforcement officers have 
been called upon to assess the risk of mentally ill persons and have either failed to 
164 Lamb, Weinberger, and DeCuir, Jr., “The Police and Mental Health.” 
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identify significant risk factors, been unreceptive to risk factors or both—with tragic 
results. This research further asserts that law enforcement can, through the application of 
clinical risk factors, identify someone at risk for violence and act to interrupt the chain of 
events leading to violence. Moreover, the Al DeGuzman and Michael Tom cases 
demonstrate that when officers identify significant risk factors for violence, are receptive 
to those risk factors, and take action to intervene, violence can be averted. 
In addition to missing or ignoring warning signs and other indicators of possible 
dangerousness, this research has identified three significant deficiencies with how many 
law enforcement officers currently conduct, or fail to conduct, violence risk assessments 
of mentally ill persons. First, LEOs receive little training on how to conduct such risk 
assessments. Second, LEOs have a framework or guide for conducting comprehensive 
risk assessments. Finally, many LEOs view risk as a dichotomous, “yes or no” 
proposition—either the person poses a risk for violence or they do not. In reality, the risk 
for violence should be considered along a continuum of risk and assessed accordingly. 
Psychiatrists and other clinicians have grappled with accurately assessing the 
“dangerousness” of certain subjects for years, providing rich theoretical frameworks that 
should serve as the foundation for law enforcement risk assessments. As the result of this 
continuous research, the risk paradigm has shifted from a “yes/no” prediction of 
dangerousness to an evaluation of risk along a continuum from a lower risk of violence, 
to a higher risk of violence.165 Similarly, law enforcement must also begin gauging risk 
for violence along a continuum and not simply attempt a “yes/no” decision regarding 
dangerousness and the likelihood for violence.  
Law enforcement officers have an obligation to conduct fact based, evidence 
driven assessments of dangerousness and to use the same investigative techniques they 
regularly employ in more traditional criminal investigations. To achieve this goal, law 
enforcement officers require an empirical, comprehensive, yet simple violence risk 
assessment tool that will help them to identify warning indicators that a person with 
mental illness is on pathway to violence. This violence risk assessment instrument should 
165 Conroy, and Murrie, Forensic Assessment of Violence Risk, 7. 
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be based on the decades of existing clinical research, data and established risk factors. In 
addition, it should be used to address the more nuanced components of violence, such as 
the imminence of violence, the potential severity of violence, the likelihood of weapons 
use, and other factors or conditions most conducive to violence in a particular case.166 
B. A FIELD RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Given the obvious differences in training and experience between clinicians and 
law enforcement officers, the setting where the assessments must occur (field versus 
office, hospital, or clinical environment), and the time constraints often present in a law 
enforcement contact,167 it is important for any law enforcement risk assessment tool to be 
adapted from the clinical format and both streamlined and simplified for field use by non-
clinicians. As reported in this thesis, law enforcement officers are regularly called upon 
to make violence risk assessments in the field that can affect both the liberty interests of 
mentally ill persons, as well as the safety of the community officers serve. Providing 
LEOs with a field risk assessment guide adapted from clinical frameworks, which have 
been in use for years and validated in clinical trials, will inevitably assist them in making 
better decisions when dealing with mentally ill persons. 
As the DeAnza College and Gardnerville, Nevada thwarted attacks indicate, many 
law enforcement officers, using nothing more than their limited training and significant 
experience, demonstrate some ability to identify mentally ill persons who pose a risk for 
violence. Sadly, the WNY and Isla Vista, California cases demonstrate the need for 
additional training to improve officer recognition of warning signs and increased 
receptivity to warning signs. Use of a structured tool for assessing risk would improve 
officer risk assessments, and it could have potentially changed the outcome in the WNY 
and Isla Vista cases.  
By examining both traditional law enforcement and clinical approaches to risk 
assessment, this research has identified several critical risk factors for violence, which 
166 Ibid. 
167 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the1968 landmark case Terry v. Ohio, that police are limited in 
how long they may detain a subject to a reasonable amount of time to conduct an investigation, and they 
must be able articulate the reasons for any such temporary detention.  
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can be constructed in such a way as to provide law enforcement personnel with a reliable 
framework for assessing the potential dangerousness of a mentally ill person contacted in 
the field, as well as the imminence of potential violence. In broad categories, these risk 
factors consist of personal or demographic risk factors, historical risk factors, clinical risk 
factors, and contextual risk factors and should be developed into a template or guide for 
public safety field use (see Table 6). 
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Table 6.   The Field Risk Assessment Guide  
 
Law enforcement officers tasked with assessing a mentally ill person for 
dangerousness are acting in good faith, and they should be expected to err on the side of 
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caution—to intervene and interrupt the chain of events that could lead to violence; to 
make reasonable inferences based on an objective, articulable facts, rather than miss, or, 
worse, ignore critical warning signs.  
C. IMPLEMENTATION AND NEXT STEPS 
The field risk assessment guide (FRAG) proposed in this paper could serve as a 
template for law enforcement organizations nationally to improve officer conducted 
assessments of dangerousness and be deployed for use in the field immediately. Use of 
the FRAG would greatly improve law enforcement’s response to persons with mental 
illness by increasing the likelihood of treatment of mentally ill persons, reducing the 
incidence of violence among persons with mental illness, and, perhaps, even pre-empting 
some mass murder events. The FRAG is not intended to limit officer discretion or 
mandate a particular outcome, such as involuntary civil commitment, but is simply 
designed to provide a structured guide by which an officer can assess the dangerousness 
posed by a particular individual. In addition, FRAG is not limited to use in cases where 
mental illness is suspected, as mental illness is only one factor in assessing the risk for 
violence.  
Widespread adoption of the FRAG or similar tool designed for field use could be 
accomplished quickly, and with little cost to law enforcement organizations.168 Ideally, 
training on the use of the FRAG could be provided to new recruits at police training 
academies in a four to eight hour block of training, in Field Training Officer (FTO) 
programs over the course of several weeks of on-the-job training, or it could be integrated 
into the week-long CIT course currently provided to many law enforcement officers 
across the country, thereby filling a vital missing component of current CIT training. In-
service training of veteran officers on use of the FRAG would be relatively simple, given 
that it provides a framework to guide officers through a task that they are already doing 
on a regular basis, possibly even simplifying the process through consistency.  
168 While there is little anticipated cost to law enforcement organizations, mental health care providers 
should anticipate a modest increase in involuntary commitments and referrals for treatment. 
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When considering the problem of mental illness, violence, and strategies for 
enhancing public safety, stakeholders can be broken into three primary groups: 1) the 
public at large, which is increasingly concerned about what appears to be an increase in 
acts of violence and mass murder perpetrated by the mentally ill; 2) law enforcement 
personnel, who are tasked with pursuing their public safety mission while recognizing the 
rights and treatment needs of persons suffering from mental illness; and 3) clinicians, 
mental health care professionals, and those who advocate on behalf of the mentally ill 
and who are primarily concerned with protecting the rights of persons with mental illness, 
ensuring that they receive effective treatment for their illnesses. Changing current public 
safety practices by implementing the FRAG will ideally involve the support of each of 
these stakeholders, especially law enforcement executives and forensic mental health care 
partners. Through necessity, law enforcement has been forming a closer partnership with 
forensic mental health care providers over the past few decades. Successful 
implementation of the FRAG would benefit from the support of these partners. 
The FRAG does not recommend actions or outcomes. Rather, it seeks to aid 
officers in recognizing warning signs that a mentally ill person could be on the pathway 
to violence. Enforcement options are left to the discretion of the officers on scene and are 
typically controlled by law and policy, varying state-by-state and agency-by-agency. 
While this means the FRAG should not be in conflict with any state law or agency policy 
regarding interaction with mentally ill persons, agencies seeking to adopt this field risk 
assessment guide should seek input from their city, county, or state attorneys to ensure 
that this risk assessment instrument is both compatible and in compliance with individual 
state laws governing involuntary commitments and the treatment of mentally ill persons.  
Finally, this research was designed to narrowly focus on and address the pressing 
public safety problem of mass murder and extreme violence committed by persons with 
mental illness. By recommending a structured approach to law enforcement risk 
assessments, it is suggested that some violence can be prevented, and some mentally ill 
persons can receive the treatment so desperately needed. Looking to the future, many 
other challenges within the sphere of mental illness and public policy will likely remain 
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unabated, requiring the continued attention of scholars, researchers, clinicians, public 
safety personnel, policy analysts, and politicians. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis builds upon Chief Michael Biasotti’s research,169 which explored the 
impact persons with mental illness have on law enforcement resources. There remain 
many significant issues and public policy challenges regarding mental illness that warrant 
further research. First, there remain two areas of future research relating specifically to 
the field risk assessment guide. One is that of validating the field risk assessment guide’s 
efficacy in reducing violence and increase treatment of persons with mental illness. 
Validating the FRAG in general, as well as the component risk factors, is critical to 
demonstrating its effectiveness. Validation could be accomplished through future 
research that measures violence locally where the FRAG has been deployed and perhaps 
by measuring mass murders nationally if deployed broadly enough to determine if 
enhanced risk assessments have in fact lowered the incidence of violence committed by 
persons with mental illness. The second area of future research relating to the FRAG is 
that of establishing metrics or values for the component risk factors in order to identify 
which factors are most indicative of violence and to prioritize the risk factors 
accordingly.  
One problem enhanced risk assessments do nothing to solve is that of the acute 
lack of bed space for those most seriously affected by mental illness and those who have 
been deemed most dangerous. The work of Biasotti and others has documented these 
problems sufficiently; however there remain few options and a lack of will, both publicly 
and politically (not to mention the lack of funding in most communities), to build the 
facilities necessary to house the severest cases.  
The lack of enforcement and treatment options for public safety personnel 
confronted with a mentally ill person in crisis is another ongoing challenge. Even when 
dangerousness and the risk for violence are identified in a person with mental illness, law 
enforcement officers have few options for addressing the situation. Options for 
169 Biasotti, “Management of the Severely Mentally Ill and its Effects on Homeland Security.”  
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addressing a mentally ill person in crisis typically include arrest or citation where a crime 
has occurred; the initiation of involuntary commitment proceedings, transport to a 
hospital for treatment, a referral for treatment at a later date; or no action whatsoever, 
when the mentally ill person has not committed a crime. Most law enforcement officers 
and clinicians know from experience that involuntary commitment is a short-term 
solution, which alone typically will not solve or eliminate dangerousness altogether. 
Persons committed to psychiatric hospitals on an involuntary basis often receive 
treatment that is limited in scope, are often released precipitately, and are not monitored 
effectively, if at all, once released to ensure compliance with prescribed anti-psychotic 
medications or other therapies.170 Subsequently, expanding compulsory or assisted 
outpatient treatment, mental health courts, or other programs for mentally ill persons that 
are deemed dangerous poses an ongoing challenge and an area meriting further research. 
Another significant public policy challenge warranting further research is that of 
balancing the constitutional rights of persons with mental illness with the public safety 
goal of keeping firearms out of the hands of mentally ill persons who are not competent 





170 APA Panel of Experts, “Gun Violence: Prediction, Prevention, and Policy,” American 
Psychological Association, 2013), http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/gun-violence-prevention.aspx, 22. 
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APPENDIX B. DSM-IV DEFINITION OF SERIOUS MENTAL 
ILLNESS AND CODES BY DISORDER 
“Serious Mental Illness” (Adult with a Serious Mental Illness) means an individual 18 
years of age or older who meets the following criteria:185 
 
A. Currently or at any time during the past year have had a diagnosable mental, 
behavioral or emotional disorder of sufficient duration to meet criteria specified 
within DSM-IV with the exception of "V" codes, substance use disorders, and 
developmental disorders, unless they co-occur with another diagnosable serious 
mental illness; 
and 
B. Has at least (a) moderate impairment in at least four, (b) severe impairment in two or 
(c) extreme impairment in one of the following areas: 
1. Feeling, Mood, and Affect: Uncontrolled emotion is clearly disruptive in its 
effects on other aspects of a person's life. Marked change in mood. Depression 
and/or anxiety incapacitates person. Emotional responses are inappropriate to the 
situation. 
2. Thinking: Severe impairment in concentration, persistence, and pace. Frequent or 
consistent interference with daily life due to impaired thinking. Presence of 
delusions and/or hallucinations.  Frequent substitution of fantasy for reality. 
3. Family: Disruption of family relationships. Family does not function as a unit and 
experiences frequent turbulence. Relationships that exist are psychologically 
devastating. 
4. Interpersonal: Severe inability to establish or maintain a personal social support 
system. Lacks close friends or group affiliations. Socially isolated. 
5. Role Performance: Frequent disruption of role performance and individual is 
unable to meet usual expectations. Unable to obtain or maintain employment 
and/or conduct daily living chores such as care of immediate living environment. 
6. Socio-legal: Inability to maintain conduct within the limits prescribed by law, 
rules, and strong mores. Disregard for safety of others. Destructive to property. 
Involvement with law enforcement. 
7. Self Care/Basic Needs: Disruption in the ability to provide for his/her own needs 
such as food, clothing, shelter, and transportation. Assistance required in 
obtaining housing, food and/or clothing. Unable to maintain hygiene, diet, 
clothing, and prepare food. 
or 
C. Has a duration of illness of at least one year and (a) at least moderate impairment in 
two, or (b) severe impairment in one of the following areas: 
1. Feeling, Mood, and Affect: Uncontrolled emotion is clearly disruptive in its 
effects on other aspects of a person's life. Marked change in mood. Depression 
185 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. 
(Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2000). All material in Appendix B is from this source. 
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and/or anxiety incapacitates person. Emotional responses are inappropriate to the 
situation. 
2. Thinking: Severe impairment in concentration, persistence and pace. Frequent or 
consistent interference with daily life due to impaired thinking. Presence of 
delusions and/or hallucinations. Frequent substitution of fantasy for reality. 
3. Family: Disruption of family relationships. Family does not function as a unit and 
experiences frequent turbulence. Relationships that exist are psychologically 
devastating. 
4. Interpersonal: Severe inability to establish or maintain a personal social support 
system. Lacks close friends or group affiliations. Socially isolated. 
5. Role Performance: Frequent disruption of role performance and individual is 
unable to meet usual expectations. Unable to obtain or maintain employment 
and/or conduct daily living chores such as, care of immediate living environment. 
6. Socio-legal: Inability to maintain conduct within the limits prescribed by law, 
rules, and strong mores. Disregard for safety of others. Destructive to property. 
Involvement with law enforcement. 
7. Self Care/Basic Needs: Disruption in the ability to provide for his/her own needs 
such as food, clothing, shelter and transportation. Assistance required in obtaining 
housing, food and/or clothing. Unable to maintain hygiene, diet, clothing, and 
prepare food. 
 
DSM-IV DIAGNOSIS CODES 
Please note that these codes reflect the organizational structure specifically of the DSM-
IV, not the DSM-IV-TR, which is the current version as of this writing. 
Code Disorder Category 
308.3 Acute Stress Disorder Anxiety Disorders 
309.9 Adjustment Disorder Unspecified Adjustment Disorders 
309.24 Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety Adjustment Disorders 
309.0 Adjustment Disorder with Depressed 
Mood 
Adjustment Disorders 
309.3 Adjustment Disorder with 
Disturbance of Conduct 
Adjustment Disorders 
309.28 Adjustment Disorder with Mixed 
Anxiety and Depressed Mood 
Adjustment Disorders 
309.4 Adjustment Disorder with Mixed 
Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct 
Adjustment Disorders 
300.22 Agoraphobia without History of 
Panic Disorder 
Anxiety Disorders 
307.1 Anorexia Nervosa Eating Disorders 
301.7 Antisocial Personality Disorder Personality Disorders 




Code Disorder Category 
300 Anxiety Disorder, NOS Anxiety Disorders 
301.82 Avoidant Personality Disorder Personality Disorders 
296.8 Bipolar Disorder NOS Mood Disorders 
296.56 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Depressed, In Full Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.55 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Depressed, In Partial Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.51 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Depressed, Mild 
Mood Disorders 
296.52 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Depressed, Moderate 
Mood Disorders 
296.54 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 




I Disorder, Most Recent 




I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Depressed, Unspecified 
Mood Disorders 
296.46 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Manic, In Full Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.45 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Manic, In Partial Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.41 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Manic, Mild 
Mood Disorders 
296.42 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Manic, Moderate 
Mood Disorders 
296.44 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Manic, Severe With Psychotic Features 
Mood Disorders 
296.43 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Manic, Severe Without Psychotic 
Mood Disorders 
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Code Disorder Category 
Features 
296.40 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Manic, Unspecified 
Mood Disorders 
296.66 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Mixed, In Full Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.65 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Mixed, In Partial Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.61 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Mixed, Mild 
Mood Disorders 
296.62 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Mixed, Moderate 
Mood Disorders 
296.64 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Mixed, Severe With Psychotic Features 
Mood Disorders 
296.63 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 




I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Mixed, Unspecified 
Mood Disorders 
296.7 Bipolar 
I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Unspecified 
Mood Disorders 
296.40 Bipolar I Disorder, Most Recent 
Episode Hypomanic 
Mood Disorders 
296.06 Bipolar I Disorder, Single Manic 
Episode, In Full Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.05 Bipolar I Disorder, Single Manic 
Episode, In Partial Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.01 Bipolar I Disorder, Single Manic 
Episode, Mild 
Mood Disorders 
296.02 Bipolar I Disorder, Single Manic 
Episode, Moderate 
Mood Disorders 
296.04 Bipolar I Disorder, Single Manic 
Episode, Severe With Psychotic Features 
Mood Disorders 
296.03 Bipolar I Disorder, Single Manic 
Episode, Severe Without Psychotic Features 
Mood Disorders 
296.00 Bipolar I Disorder, Single Manic Mood Disorders 
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Code Disorder Category 
Episode, Unspecified 
296.89 Bipolar II Disorder Mood Disorders 
300.7 Body Dysmorphic Disorder Somatoform Disorders 
301.83 Borderline Personality Disorder Personality Disorders 
780.59 Breathing-Related Sleep Disorder Sleep Disorders, 
Dyssomnias 
298.8 Brief Psychotic Disorder Psychotic Disorders 
307.51 Bulimia Nervosa Eating Disorders 
307.45 Circadian Rhythm Sleep Disorder Sleep Disorders, 
Dyssomnias 
300.11 Conversion Disorder Somatoform Disorders 
301.13 Cyclothymic Disorder Mood Disorders 
297.1 Delusional Disorder Psychotic Disorders 
301.6 Dependent Personality Disorder Personality Disorders 




300.12 Dissociative Amnesia Dissociative Disorders 
300.15 Dissociative Disorder NOS Dissociative Disorders 
300.13 Dissociative Fugue Dissociative Disorders 
300.14 Dissociative Identity Disorder Dissociative Disorders 
302.76 Dyspareunia Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
307.47 Dyssomnia NOS Sleep Disorders, 
Dyssomnias 
307.44 Dyssomnia Related to (Another 
Disorder) 
Sleep Disorders 
300.4 Dysthymic Disorder Mood Disorders 
307.5 Eating Disorder NOS Eating Disorders 
302.4 Exhibitionism Sexual Disorders, 
Paraphilias 
625 Female 
Dyspareunia Due to Medical 
Condition 
Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
625.8 Female Hypoactive Sexual Desire 
Disorder Due to Medical Condition 
Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
302.73 Female Orgasmic Disorder Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
302.72 Female Sexual Arousal Disorder Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
302.81 Fetishism Sexual Disorders, 
Paraphilias 
302.89 Frotteurism Sexual Disorders, 
Paraphilias 
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Code Disorder Category 
302.85 Gender Identity Disorder in 
Adolescents or Adults 
Sexual Disorders, Gender 
Identity 
Disorder 
302.6 Gender Identity Disorder in 
Children 
Sexual Disorders, Gender 
Identity 
Disorder 
302.6 Gender Identity Disorder NOS Sexual Disorders, Gender 
Identity 
Disorder 
300.02 Generalized Anxiety Disorder Anxiety Disorders 
301.50 Histrionic Personality Disorder Personality Disorders 
302.71 Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
300.7 Hypochondriasis Somatoform Disorders 
312.3 Impulse -Control Disorder NOS Impulse-Control Disorders 
307.42 Insomnia Related to (Another 
Disorder) 
Sleep Disorders 
312.34 Intermittent Explosive Disorder Impulse-Control Disorders 
312.32 Kleptomania Impulse-Control Disorders 
296.36 Major Depressive Disorder, 
Recurrent, In Full Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.35 Major Depressive Disorder, 
Recurrent, In Partial Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.31 Major Depressive Disorder, 
Recurrent, Mild 
Mood Disorders 
296.32 Major Depressive Disorder, 
Recurrent, Moderate 
Mood Disorders 
296.34 Major Depressive Disorder, 
Recurrent, Severe With Psychotic Features 
Mood Disorders 
296.33 Major Depressive Disorder, 
Recurrent, Severe Without Psychotic Features 
Mood Disorders 
296.30 Major Depressive Disorder, 
Recurrent, Unspecified 
Mood Disorders 
296.26 Major Depressive Disorder, Single 
Episode, In Full Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.25 Major Depressive Disorder, Single 
Episode, In Partial Remission 
Mood Disorders 
296.21 Major Depressive Disorder, Single 
Episode, Mild 
Mood Disorders 
296.22 Major Depressive Disorder, Single 
Episode, Moderate 
Mood Disorders 
296.24 Major Depressive Disorder, Single 
Episode, Severe With Psychotic Features 
Mood Disorders 
296.23 Major Depressive Disorder, Single Mood Disorders 
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Code Disorder Category 
Episode, Severe Without Psychotic Features 




Dyspareunia Due to Medical 
Condition 
Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
302.72 Male Erectile Disorder Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
607.84 Male Erectile Disorder Due to 
Medical Condition 
Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
608.89 Male Hypoactive Sexual Desire 
Disorder Due to Medical Condition 
Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
302.74 Male Orgasmic Disorder Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
293.83 Mood Disorder Due to Medical 
Condition 
Mood Disorders 
301.81 Narcissistic Personality Disorder Personality Disorders 
347 Narcolepsy Sleep Disorders, 
Dyssomnias 
307.47 Nightmare Disorder Sleep Disorders, 
Parasomnias 
300.3 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Anxiety Disorders 
301.4 Obsessive-Compulsive Personality 
Disorder 
Personality Disorders 
625.8 Other Female Sexual Dysfunction 
Due to Medical Condition 
Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
608.89 Other Male Sexual Dysfunction Due 
to Medical Condition 
Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
307.89 Pain Disorder Associated with both 
Psychological Factors and Medical Conditions 
Somatoform Disorders 
307.8 Pain Disorder Associated with 
Psychological Features 
Somatoform Disorders 
300.21 Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia Anxiety Disorders 
300.01 Panic Disorder without Agoraphobia Anxiety Disorders 
301.0 Paranoid Personality Disorder Personality Disorders 
302.9 Paraphilia, NOS Sexual Disorders, 
Paraphilias 
307.47 Parasomnia NOS Sleep Disorders, 
Parasomnias 
312.31 Pathological Gambling Impulse-Control Disorders 
302.2 Pedophilia Sexual Disorders, 
Paraphilias 
301.9 Personality Disorder NOS Personality Disorders 
309.81 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Anxiety Disorders 
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Code Disorder Category 
302.75 Premature Ejaculation Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
307.44 Primary Hypersomnia Sleep Disorders, 
Dyssomnias 
307.42 Primary Insomnia Sleep Disorders, 
Dyssomnias 
293.81 Psychotic Disorder Due to Medical 
Condition, with Delusions 
Psychotic Disorders 
293.82 Psychotic Disorder Due to Medical 
Condition, with Hallucinations 
Psychotic Disorders 
298.9 Psychotic Disorder, NOS Psychotic Disorders 
312.33 Pyromania Impulse-Control Disorders 
295.70 Schizoaffective Disorder Psychotic Disorders 
301.20 Schizoid Personality Disorder Personality Disorders 
295.20 Schizophrenia, Catatonic Type Psychotic Disorders 
295.10 Schizophrenia, Disorganized Type Psychotic Disorders 
295.30 Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type Psychotic Disorders 
295.60 Schizophrenia, Residual Type Psychotic Disorders 
295.90 Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated 
Type 
Psychotic Disorders 
295.40 Schizophreniform Disorder Psychotic Disorders 
301.22 Schizotypal Personality Disorder Personality Disorders 
302.79 Sexual Aversion Disorder Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
302.9 Sexual Disorder NOS Sexual Disorders 
302.7 Sexual Dysfunction NOS Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
302.83 Sexual Masochism Sexual Disorders, 
Paraphilias 
302.84 Sexual Sadism Sexual Disorders, 
Paraphilias 
297.3 Shared Psychotic Disorder Psychotic Disorders 
780.54 Sleep Disorder Due to A Medical 
Condition, Hypersomnia Type 
Sleep Disorders 
780.52 Sleep Disorder Due to A Medical 
Condition, Insomnia Type 
Sleep Disorders 
780.59 Sleep Disorder Due to A Medical 
Condition, Mixed Type 
Sleep Disorders 
780.59 Sleep Disorder Due to A Medical 
Condition, Parasomnia Type 
Sleep Disorders 
307.46 Sleep Terror Disorder Sleep Disorders, 
Parasomnias 
307.46 Sleepwalking Disorder Sleep Disorders, 
Parasomnias 
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Code Disorder Category 




300.81 Somatoform Disorder NOS Somatoform Disorders 
300.29 Specific Phobia Anxiety Disorders 
302.3 Transvestic Fetishism Sexual Disorders, 
Paraphilias 
312.39 Trichotillomania Impulse-Control Disorders 
300.81 Undifferentiated Somatoform 
Disorder 
Somatoform Disorders 
306.51 Vaginismus Sexual Disorders, Sexual 
Dysfunctions 
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APPENDIX C. CALIFORNIA CODE 5150 
Article 1. Detention of Mentally Disordered Persons for Evaluation and Treatment 
Section 5150.186 
When any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or 
herself, or gravely disabled, a peace officer, member of the attending staff, as defined by 
regulation, of an evaluation facility designated by the county, designated members of a 
mobile crisis team provided by Section 5651.7, or other professional person designated 
by the county may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into 
custody and place him or her in a facility designated by the county and approved by the 
State Department of Social Services as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation. 
The facility shall require an application in writing stating the circumstances under which 
the person's condition was called to the attention of the officer, member of the attending 
staff, or professional person, and stating that the officer, member of the attending staff, or 
professional person has probable cause to believe that the person is, as a result of mental 
disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled. If the probable 
cause is based on the statement of a person other than the officer, member of the 
attending staff, or professional person, the person shall be liable in a civil action for 
intentionally giving a statement which he or she knows to be false. 
 
Section 5150.05. 
(a) When determining if probable cause exists to take a person into custody, or cause a 
person to be taken into custody, pursuant to Section 5150, any person who is authorized 
to take that person, or cause that person to be taken, into custody pursuant to that section 
shall consider available relevant information about the historical course of the person's 
mental disorder if the authorized person determines that the information has a reasonable 
bearing on the determination as to whether the person is a danger to others, or to himself 
or herself, or is gravely disabled as a result of the mental disorder. 
(b) For purposes of this section, "information about the historical course of the person's 
mental disorder" includes evidence presented by the person who has provided or is 
providing mental health or related support services to the person subject to a 
determination described in subdivision (a), evidence presented by one or more members 
of the family of that person, and evidence presented by the person subject to a 
determination described in subdivision (a) or anyone designated by that person. 
(c) If the probable cause in subdivision (a) is based on the statement of a person other 
than the one authorized to take the person into custody pursuant to Section 5150, a 
member of the attending staff, or a professional person, the person making the statement 
shall be liable in a civil action for intentionally giving any statement that he or she knows 
to be false. 
(d) This section shall not be applied to limit the application of Section 5328.  
186 California Legislature, “Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5150,” accessed September 29, 
2014, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=wic&group=05001-06000&file=5150-5155. 
All material in Appendix C is from this source.  
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